#perimeter alarm
Security systems of the sea fishing port.
A sea fishing port is a very large and complex enterprise. Several kilometers of berths, sometimes more than ten square kilometers of water area. Worse, as a rule, this is not one enterprise, but many independent ones, to which are added a huge number of tenants (even a stevedoring company is usually a tenant of berths and warehouses, and often several stevedores work in one port). The only thing that makes the task of guarding such an object easier is the fact that, like any sea port, it is a border, strategic and therefore guarded by dedicated units of the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. True, the actual duty at the checkpoint is carried out by security companies, but the personnel of these companies and the order of organization of the service are very traditional and are carefully checked by the relevant competent organizations.
However, nowadays the fishing seaport is forced to directly compete with foreign ports, where formal procedures are often much simpler than our own domestic ones, and the overall crime rate is much lower. It is possible to convince domestic (and ideally not only domestic) fishermen to use the services of the port only if the protection from criminal attacks is also at a high level.
Nowadays, the situation when the fence of a typical fishing port was mostly holes, occasionally interspersed with sagging posts, is gradually becoming a thing of the past. Checkpoints are usually equipped with radiation monitoring and video recording systems. The relatively strict access control at the checkpoint excludes cases of major theft (except for theft with forged documents). However, with a large number of legal entities operating on the territory of the port, the registration of forged documents is not so difficult. Thus, an important condition for the quiet operation of tenants is the organization of centralized security of warehouse premises. Yes, petty theft is not critical in a fishing port; a shortage of several kilograms of fish for refrigerated trucks handling tens of thousands of tons is quite within the framework of normal «shrinkage». However, the presence of heavy trucks legally entering the territory and the availability of various loading equipment makes it possible to steal a very significant amount of goods in a few minutes. And then try to prove that the truck, for which all the documents have been drawn up, contains stolen goods. To combat possible thefts, it is important to organize rapid response teams, and if this is difficult, then video surveillance with video recording throughout the entire port area. Fortunately, to prevent significant thefts (in the amount of more than a ton of cargo), it is enough to record the movements of such large objects as cars, their loading and unloading locations. Of course, there are especially large thefts, when ships or entire ports are stolen, but port security is powerless against such thefts, they are carried out not on the port territory, but in cozy offices thousands of miles from the port.
The already mentioned high competition leads to underutilization of the fishing ports designed in the era of planned economy, which, in turn, causes the need for their diversification. Container handling is the norm for fishing ports, they often unload cars, carry out primary processing and packaging of fish, and some fishing ports even have oil terminals. All this increases the requirements for the quality of security. Container cargo is often much more expensive per specific kilogram. Owners of such goods as electronics are no longer inclined to turn a blind eye to the «shrinkage» of several kilograms. Such warehouses must be provided with security with a very quick response and additional protection against unauthorized access to the warehouses must be provided.
Some sensitive facilities also require special access control, in particular fuel storage facilities exposed to terrorist threats. In general, the need for enhanced security of individual zones means echeloned security, as it is commonly called at nuclear-hazardous facilities. Perimeter alarms on the outer fence of the port, even more enhanced perimeter security of designated areas with increased security, an access control system in the area of increased security. Distributed security and video verification system in the area of special zones.
For many ports, all of the above will seem like fantasy, although there is nothing particularly complicated or expensive about it. The main problem with equipping ports is their large territory, and, accordingly, the large length of cable lines and their high cost. Integrated systems are now increasingly available, allowing all local equipment to be connected to a single controller in an all-weather design (both alarms, and access control, and even video surveillance), which allows significant savings both on the cable network and on the means of protecting and organizing the data network. Standard interfaces (relatively speaking, Ethernet) have a relatively low cost, even if you use fiber lines or separate wireless sections of communication lines.
It should be noted that it may be more convenient to use quickly deployable perimeter systems around the cargo area rather than a permanent fence to protect container cargo. This does not require permanently dividing the territory into “very secure” and “not very secure” – after all, it is difficult to predict the port’s needs in a month or two. Unload one large vessel – and it may be necessary to significantly redraw the map of storage areas.
Water area protection systems are really difficult to install and especially to maintain. In a fishing port, this may seem unnecessary, but if there is an oil loading terminal, and sometimes just as part of a fuel oil depot, there are underwater pipelines. It is useful to protect them from both theft (cuts) and terrorist threats. However, it is not easy to provide such protection. In most cases, the maximum that is actually used is a system of close-range surface radars to monitor the movement of floating craft. The root of the problem is in non-core cargo. The level of security, more than sufficient for a purely fishing port, turns out to be insufficient for other cargoes and completely unacceptable for dangerous cargoes (even regular oil).
A noticeable technical problem in ports is protection from the external environment. A very common opinion that a fishing port is dirty is far from the truth. Thanks to the efforts of the veterinary service, it is much cleaner than most ordinary cargo terminals, especially, say, coal terminals. Nevertheless, it is the frequent washing of berths (and they are washed, of course, with sea water) that further increases the requirements for the protection of equipment and cables. The coastal strip (any port) is always considered a particularly dangerous zone that requires high protection of equipment. It is not without reason that it is recommended to use sealed video cameras, pre-inflated with dry nitrogen, for coastal systems. After all, ordinary casings have a «breather» to equalize the pressure outside and inside the casing, and even a small amount of salt water getting on delicate electronics is extremely dangerous.
However, as equipment becomes cheaper, it is often more profitable to have a reserve and quickly replace failed items, rather than to protect them from adverse environmental conditions. The described stainless steel casings with pre-pressurization cost tens of times more than conventional ones, so they should be used only in cases where the items are difficult to replace (video cameras are sometimes installed based on considerations of better visibility, i.e. on high masts or structures that are difficult to access for maintenance).
The enormous length of the cable network, given that the equipment is often installed on high structures carrying lightning rods, means serious problems with protection against electromagnetic interference. And since most standard interfaces are not designed to transmit signals over distances over 300-1000 m, the use of fiber optic lines is almost inevitable. Sometimes it is cheaper to use wireless sections, but such equipment itself has to be carried upwards, and therefore it must be especially protected from strong interference (multi-level lightning protection devices on all data and power lines). In general, one should try to avoid long copper communication lines, even if it is possible to conduct them in cable collectors. All the same, due to significant changes in ground potential, it will be necessary to use numerous galvanic isolation devices. It is often cheaper to simply use optical lines.
In conclusion, I would like to remind you that the protection must be comprehensive (equally strong) and proportionate. These general principles will come in handy when equipping any facility. There is no point in organizing an access control system on a gate in an unguarded or dilapidated fence. There is no point in installing a high-quality video surveillance system at a crushed stone unloading site. On the other hand, it is strange to save on security at a pier for unloading luxury cars, and it is criminal to leave toxic or flammable cargo without proper security.