|
In this issue with you:
Vyacheslav TESAKOV, CEO of Ravelin
Alexey KADEYSHVILI, Technical Director of VOKORD
Alexey OMELYANCHUK, Sigma – Integrated Systems research and production company
Leonid STASENKO, RELVEST group of companies
Question for discussion
It is clear that it is impossible to ensure absolute safety of public transport not only from terrorist attacks, but even from hooligan actions. To what extent can modern TSB improve the safety of the metro and other types of public transport?
Vyacheslav TESAKOV:
— Very important. Any type of transport is considered a high-risk area. Accordingly, additional special control methods are required. The very presence of video surveillance systems will reduce the level of vandalism and crime in transport. However, as is known, when using technical security means, a response service, an operation service, etc. are required. This is the main problem. After all, there is a dispatching service in transport, and security is ensured by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. At the same time, they are mainly busy monitoring passengers entering or exiting public transport. But it is necessary to have an operational control and response service that would constantly monitor the situation in the rolling stock and at stations. Then, if an alarm occurs, this service will be able to promptly consider the situation and take the necessary measures.
Alexey KADEYSHVILI
— I think that it is impossible to solve the problem of ensuring complete security in the metro using only technical means. The most effective means of combating terrorism is the prompt work of special services, preventing terrorist attacks at the preparation stage. An effective means of combating hooliganism is a professionally organized police patrol service, ensuring a quick response to incidents and guaranteeing the inevitability of punishment for violators. In any case, the TSB will play a supporting role.
Often, in connection with the problem of security, they talk about all sorts of detectors — metal detectors, explosive detectors, etc. However, the main problems of metro security are intensive passenger flows, in which the number of potential criminals is thousandths of a percent in the absence of restrictions on the things carried by passengers.
In order for security equipment not to paralyze the work of the metro, they must meet requirements that, given today's level of technological development, are, on the one hand, very high (extreme), and on the other — mutually exclusive:
1. High speed of processing input information;
2. High selectivity (systems must be able to distinguish items permitted for transportation from prohibited ones);
3. Low percentage of errors of the first and second kind, i.e. the probability of false alarms must be less than 0.01% (or better yet 0.001%), so as not to create congestion in the movement of passenger flows, and the probability of false passes of suspicious persons must be 10-100 times less than the percentage of potential criminals in the passenger flow).
Therefore, of all the complex of TSB in the metro, the most effective is video surveillance. Firstly, it allows practically not to interfere with the work of the transport hub and control the situation in a larger area, secondly, high-quality video recording, which is provided by modern video surveillance systems, allows to effectively investigate crimes.
Alexey OMELYANCHUK:
— 90% of the effect is the influence of psychological factors. The more video cameras there are, the more this fact influences the behavior of potential criminals. Of course, after the second bottle, the sea is knee-deep, and video cameras are not perceived as a deterrent either. But a large group of potential hooligans will restrain themselves, at least until they leave the metro. The same applies to terrorists — they are also people, they are afraid of being watched, they start to get nervous and, as in the last case in the Moscow metro, or in the previous case near the metro — there could have been many more victims.
And, of course, for the investigation (and therefore prevention of possible repeated terrorist attacks), the more video cameras – the more information, the better.
General security measures are also necessary. So far, I am not aware of any cases where terrorists or hooligans have tried to use service premises, but this should not be allowed. Protecting these premises (including the entrances to the tunnels) is relatively simple and cheap, and, of course, it is justified.
As for more exotic means, such as explosive detection, I hope that at least some of the allocated money will be used to continue scientific research in this area. However, as far as I know, existing systems will not soon catch up with a dog's nose in terms of efficiency and practical applicability.
Leonid STASENKO:
If it were possible to solve the security issues in the subway, then they would be solved automatically in other types of transport — the subway is the hardest to solve today due to its specifics: a closed space of limited volume, colossal passenger flows. Most of the possible measures to improve security lie in the organizational sphere, and only a small part in the technical sphere. It is impossible to control the carrying of explosives «on the fly» during rush hour — there are no such devices yet. The most that can be done with some efficiency is rapid face recognition. But this requires the creation of a database of terrorists' faces (real or potential), which requires efforts from the special services, and in the event of detection of such persons — again, rapid detention of dangerous persons by human resources.
Of course, to investigate incidents (after terrorist attacks or their attempts), high-quality video recording of almost the entire space of the subway, including in the cars, is needed.
I do not see any other more or less effective technical solutions today.
Question for discussion
From media publications, one can conclude that a comprehensive security system is being developed for the subway, which, according to experts, is one of the most vulnerable types of public transport. What components should a system include that could really help reduce the level of possible threats?
Vyacheslav TESAKOV:
— Dear colleagues, such a system is already being created. At least in St. Petersburg and Moscow. There is no need to develop anything anew. The concept exists, has been approved and is being implemented. It is constantly being refined depending on new input data. New solutions are being sought for these input data. This process will always continue. And in my opinion, the only way to really reduce the level of threats is to specifically train all metro personnel on an ongoing basis, not just police officers. The same way that flight crews are trained in airlines. Then it will be much more difficult for criminals to act.
Alexey KADEISHVILI:
The basis of the integrated security system should be a system of overview video surveillance in combination with a system of non-cooperative extraction of facial images and their recognition. The first should answer the question «what happened?», i.e. show the «plot» and dynamics of events, and the second — answer the question, «who did it?» — allow obtaining high-quality images of the faces of the participants in the events, containing the identifying features of the offenders necessary for reliable identification.
Gas analyzers can also be installed to promptly respond to incidents similar to those that occurred in the Tokyo subway. Along the way, we will be able to find out what kind of air we breathe in the subway.
The listed measures can be supplemented by the use of dosimeters to monitor radiation levels in case of terrorist threats using radioactive materials, although dosimeters can show an elevated background level even without terrorist attacks.
Alexey OMELYANCHUK:
— Well, you understand that statements about the development of a comprehensive system are necessary both politically and for propaganda purposes, including for psychological impact on potential criminals.
Leonid STASENKO: — See point one. It is impossible to apply effective measures, such as Ben Gurion Airport, for non-air traffic, especially in a city like Moscow.
Question for discussion
Foreign experience: do we take the best from our foreign colleagues and can we learn from the mistakes of others?
Vyacheslav TESAKOV:
— We take and know how, when we want! Only we want it quite rarely, hence all our problems. Everyone is waiting for the command from above, and then again from above, and so it turns out that we know a lot, but use little.
Alexey KADEISHVILI:
— If we take the technical aspect, then, of course, both equipment manufacturers and companies implementing TSB projects have information about equipment and technologies developed abroad, and it is taken into account when choosing specific solutions for implementing projects. If «to borrow» is a synonym for «to borrow», then the answer is negative. The philosophy of a normal company should not be to create analogues, but to create completely new solutions that, however, follow the general trend of development of world science and technology.
Alexey OMELYANCHUK:
Yes, of course. For example, in our country there were no large-scale and very expensive experiments on the implementation of facial recognition systems in a crowd. Our competent authorities made do with information about such experiments in other countries.
Leonid STASENKO:
— I hope so. The same facial recognition system in passenger traffic was tested in the US, found to be effective, and, as far as I know, should be implemented here too. Regarding other people's mistakes… We make more of our own. Mainly due to the incompetence of those people who, at times, are responsible for making decisions.
A question for discussion
Imagine the situation: you are tasked with overseeing the creation of advanced security systems for the subway. Try to formulate at least in general terms the tasks for developers and manufacturers.
Vyacheslav TESAKOV:
— Firstly, this is the creation of a high-speed face analyzer, secondly, the development of a small-sized high-speed explosive analyzer, thirdly, the development of a concept for an operational control and response service, fourthly, the development of a video monitoring system for moving objects that operates in real time.
Alexey KADEISHVILI:
Of course, this should be a comprehensive project, based on the integration of the following systems:
1) A non-cooperative biometric identification system using 3D vision technologies to control passengers purchasing tickets and video surveillance in intensive passenger flows;
2) A system for automatically reading ticket tags and comparing this information with the biometric data of passengers;
3) System for overview video surveillance and comparison of overview video information with biometric data of passengers.
Alexey OMELYANCHUK:
— Fundamentally new, what is ripe for implementation is video surveillance systems on rolling stock. But the main thing that is necessary for control of performers is clear quality criteria for acceptance of systems.
Leonid STASENKO:
— Taking into account the above, this is the formulation of the tasks of video analytics and face recognition in a specific environment, with a specific level of illumination. Naturally, with «field» testing of the proposed solutions.
Question for discussion
Considerable funds are planned to be allocated to ensure the safety of public transport. What, in your opinion, needs to be done to ensure that they are spent with maximum efficiency?
Vyacheslav TESAKOV:
— The first thing that needs to be done is to establish control over the spending of funds. Secondly, change the structure of the security service, introducing operational control and response forces into it. Thirdly, hold an open competition among security market specialists to develop proposals for equipping public transport with security equipment, that is, come up with ideas. Fourthly, invest money in the development of special control devices for the metro.
Alexey KADEISHVILI:
First of all, it is necessary to have a competent customer interested in improving metro security. This customer must have a good understanding of the operational situation in the metro, have a list of threats, ordered by the degree of danger and the probability of their implementation. The customer must also have an idea of the existing TSB and their capabilities.
The customer must select a system integrator that has the necessary expertise in the field of building large distributed security systems. This integrator must have experience in creating technical security systems, and not experience in supplying a large number of computers to government agencies, and not experience in building data transmission networks with mind-boggling bandwidth!
And, naturally, the selection of equipment suppliers should be carried out not on the basis of advertising materials, but on the basis of comparative equipment tests. Ideally, a preliminary selection of candidates should be made based on performance characteristics, and then field tests should be carried out under real operating conditions in the metro.
But in any case, the success of the project will depend on the interest in solving the task and the qualifications of the customer. And the work of the services providing security should be built taking into account the capabilities of the installed technical means. The customer's staff should include qualified specialists who are able to properly operate the installed TSB.
And one more thing. It should be a comprehensive project approach. That is, the creation of a modern security system should be divided into several stages with observable deadlines, tangible results and measurable quality criteria. The stages of forming requirements for the future system and its design are especially important. It is obvious that the efficiency of the money spent is determined by the efficiency of the system's operation/use. And this means that it is important not so much to implement the system («master» the budget), as to ensure the development of the system in the future. That is, it is important to take into account many factors that remain in the shadows at the stage of system implementation — the ability of the contractor to provide professional services for personnel training, technical support, fast delivery and replacement of spare parts, software updates, hardware, etc., etc.In large projects, it is necessary to prevent the emergence of an «information zoo», when fragments of solutions from several vendors are integrated into a «single information space». At the implementation stage, such a system will work, but in the long term, it is very difficult to ensure its reliable operation (updating programs and equipment from different vendors, synchronizing and exchanging data, etc.). In other words, if possible, you need to focus on a comprehensive solution from a single «turnkey» vendor. At the same time, for obvious reasons, this vendor must be Russian.
Alexey OMELYANCHUK:
— The first thing I have already mentioned is fairly objective quality criteria. Now, in fact, quality is ensured indirectly, by selecting more or less reliable and conscientious suppliers. So far, I have seen attempts to formulate some objective criteria only in some banking structures.
Well, the fact that equipment for government supplies now goes at prices 3 or even 30 times higher than market prices is not only a Russian problem, although Russia's stable 147th place in the corruption rating does not allow us to hope for this coefficient to approach one soon.
By the way, the problem of overpricing is also partly connected with the lack of objective quality criteria. Instead of them, separate detailed technical requirements taken out of context are now used (after all, quality must somehow be ensured under the current law on state procurement), which leads to non-economic restriction of competition and simply unjustified hammering of nails with a microscope (or, if you like, shooting sparrows with a cannon).
Leonid STASENKO:
— The question is not simple, given our specifics of «mastering» budget money. Probably, it is not completely solvable at the current level of development of our society. But we must try. And instead of lobbying, attract the most qualified specialists (and not only technical ones). Maybe it's time, as in football, to invite a «coach» from abroad? Then we can hope for more or less objective decision-making when choosing contractors and technical means.
In general, somewhat digressing from the very specific problems raised in our conversation, I would like to say that we can discuss security issues in any sphere as much as we like: in transport, in production, in everyday life, at resorts — we can spend colossal amounts of money on this, but the result will not change much. For centuries (and especially in recent decades), humanity has been digging its own grave.
The energy intensity of modern civilization, the concentration of population in megalopolises, large-scale chemical production using deadly components, the ever-increasing dependence on computing and communications technology — all of these are symptoms of a decline in the level of security not of individuals, but of humanity as a whole. The Chernobyl disaster is not the worst thing that can happen in the modern world. And humanity will most likely perish not from a comet or a solar explosion — it itself has more and more means of self-destruction every year. Among them, the atomic bomb is also not the worst. Given the obviousness of its danger, it will most likely be completely banned in some time.
The dependence of many aspects of our lives on ubiquitous computerization is already causing serious concern in the most pragmatic departments such as the Pentagon and the like, and we are talking not only about military equipment, but also about civilian equipment. If the US computing network were to be disabled today, the catastrophe that would immediately break out would surpass any Chernobyl. But the facts that appear in the media indicate that this is not so unrealistic.
|
