PROTECTION OF OBJECTS AS AN ELEMENT OF ANTI-TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.
Korol K.N., Head of Department, Research Center of the FSB of Russia,
Silnov A.F., Deputy. Head of Department of the Research Center of the FSB of Russia,
candidate of physical and mathematical sciences
PROTECTION OF OBJECTS AS AN ELEMENT OF ANTI-TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
Although the structuring of terrorism as a social phenomenon into two main blocks – the subject of terrorist activity and the object of terrorist aspirations – does not cause much controversy in academic circles, the allocation of protection of objects of terrorist aspirations (OTA) as an element of the system of measures to combat terrorism still encounters misunderstanding and even obvious resistance from both scientists and operational law enforcement officers directly involved in the fight against terrorism.
This situation can be explained by a number of reasons, both objective and subjective. The objective reasons include the scheme for combating crime laid down in the federal laws “On the Federal Security Service Bodies in the Russian Federation”, “On Combating Terrorism”, “On the Police”, “On Operational Investigative Activities”. In these laws, the fight against specific types of crime is considered as a system of elements that can be characterized as “causal and temporal” – detection, prevention, suppression of criminal activity and investigation of committed crimes (including terrorist crimes). In subjective terms, the reluctance to single out OTU protection as a separate element of the anti-terrorist measures system is due to the erroneous idea that this element is limited to traditional security measures and is within the competence of the heads of the protected facilities. In addition, the protection of OTU is associated with defensive measures and is in some sense passive in nature, while law enforcement agencies traditionally focus on active actions.
When considering both the concept of “object of terrorist aspirations” and the concept of “protection of OTU”, an approach can be chosen based on either a narrow or a broad interpretation, which is determined by the level of specification of the object, or rather, even the level of its “materialization”.
The common object of terrorist attacks is international security, internal and external security, etc., that is, such objects that have a socio-political (intangible) nature and are protected by legislative acts of the highest level (for example, international treaties, the constitution, constitutional laws), as well as general measures of the state and its bodies to reduce political and socio-economic conflict.
Specific objects of terrorist influence include life, health, freedom of people, existence and normal functioning of various material objects. In fact, these are material objects that are directly subject to violent (physical) terrorist influence or are threatened with such influence. These objects are protected from terrorist attacks of this kind and their threats by legislative acts that have the nature of regulations on punishments (primarily, the criminal and criminal procedure codes). The protection of these objects is implemented mainly within the framework of the activities of law enforcement and law enforcement agencies.
The content of the concept of “OTU protection” is determined mainly by the range of envisaged strategies for protecting objects. With a broad interpretation of the concept of “OTU protection”, the choice of protection strategies is not limited and can vary from predominantly defensive to predominantly offensive (according to the principle “the best defense is an attack”) strategies through intermediate strategies, including their various combinations. With a narrow interpretation of the concept, protective measures are considered precisely as protective (defensive, organized in the “waiting” mode).
In order to structure and clearly distinguish between the various elements of the anti-terrorist activity system, and based on the needs of scientific research of the issue, it seems preferable to consider both the concept of “object of terrorist aspirations” and the concept of “protection of OTU” in a narrow sense. With such consideration, it becomes possible to identify and describe the features inherent in this particular element of the system of measures to combat terrorism. This approach is more consistent with the tasks and practical functions of law enforcement agencies, allows avoiding politicization of the issue and, in addition, being extremely objective, is as close as possible to the perception of the problem by ordinary citizens, which allows us to count on their understanding and assistance.
In this case, “OTU protection” means a type of activity of security agencies and other interested structures, which is characterized by the following features: implementation of fencing of the protected object in relation to an indefinite number of persons and organizations (including preventive measures to hinder access of potential terrorists to the means of committing terrorist acts); fencing of the protected object with measures, forces and means that minimize the vulnerability of the object to the risks of terrorist influence and function in the “standby” mode (i.e., in the normal mode they are passive and are activated when a terrorist act is committed or when there is a threat of one).
On the contrary, measures to identify, prevent and suppress the activities of subjects of terrorist aspirations are characterized as follows: actions in relation to a relatively clearly defined circle of individuals and organizations that are members of terrorist organizations or, possibly, involved in them (including the seizure of means of committing terrorist acts from potential terrorists); active actions, carried out constantly, having the nature of a search (in particular, a search) and aimed at identifying, preventing and suppressing the intentions of the organizers and perpetrators of terrorist acts).
It should be recognized that this approach is to a certain extent conditional, since the set of measures for the protection of the OTU includes security checks and operational-search work among the personnel of the facility and in its surroundings.
Terrorism can be analyzed from different positions. Thus, it can be assessed as a socio-political phenomenon, and in this case it is defined as a system of using violence to achieve political goals by forcing state bodies, international and national organizations, state and public figures, individual citizens or their groups to commit certain actions in favor of terrorists in order to prevent the latter from implementing threats against certain individuals and groups, as well as against life support facilities of society, sources of increased danger to people and the environment.
In order to develop the above-stated pragmatic approach to structuring anti-terrorist activities, in our opinion, it is fruitful to consider terrorism, common in Western terrorism, as a special type of social conflict. In order to develop specific measures to protect objects, typical schemes for planning and implementing terrorist acts should be reconstructed and generalized, and on their basis, the responsibilities of law enforcement agencies for identifying and suppressing terrorist acts at various stages should be distributed.
The available experience shows that it is advisable to structure the system for protecting objects of terrorist aspirations as a set of measures by executive authorities and self-defense measures for objects.
Self-defense of facilities involves increasing the vigilance of personnel of potential terrorist targets and ordinary citizens, their awareness of the nature of terrorist threats, as well as the implementation of a number of established protective measures by departmental and non-departmental security units, security services of facilities, non-governmental security and detective structures, etc. At the same time, given the unprecedented scale of terrorist activity, the issue of expanding the powers and capabilities of counter-terrorism entities, as well as increasing the activity of citizens, is legitimate. Corresponding trends are already being observed in practice. In particular, a decree of the Government of the Russian Federation allows departmental security units to use combat weapons in service with security and law enforcement agencies (under the control of internal affairs agencies). There are other examples. Thus, the Moscow UFSB and GUVD prepared, published and distributed in large quantities instructions that explain the procedure for the actions of security department employees and citizens in the event of a threat of terrorist attacks of various types (for example, when explosive devices are discovered; when receiving mail suspected of containing explosives, etc.).
Law enforcement agencies must contribute to the improvement of the system of protection of terrorist targets using both their traditional methods and the capabilities arising from their status as executive authorities. In the latter case, law enforcement units must implement the control and supervisory functions granted to them and participate in the development and implementation of a set of measures aimed at improving the protection of terrorist targets. Such measures should primarily include: development of indicators and criteria for the importance of terrorist targets from the point of view of state and public security and categorization of targets within the allocated types; study of the practice of ensuring the security and resistance of terrorist targets of priority categories to deliberate physical impacts, as well as to impacts through computer networks, through appropriate certification of targets; determination of the type and nature of threats of sabotage and terrorist intent and communication of them to the structures responsible for organizing and creating systems for protecting targets; development of practical recommendations on measures to protect objects of terrorist intent (including technical, financial, security, and regime measures) in accordance with their type and category; study of the technical and technological resistance of potentially hazardous industrial facilities to sabotage and terrorist attacks, extension of the procedure for declaring the safety of hazardous industrial facilities and hydraulic structures and issuing a license for a type of activity to issues of physical protection of facilities; periodic non-departmental monitoring of the effectiveness of facility protection systems (including by conducting exercises to counter sabotage and terrorist threats), development of recommendations on internal monitoring of the state of facility protection systems; preparation of proposals for interaction between security agencies and internal affairs agencies with facility protection systems in routine and emergency situations, participation in the development and approval of interaction plans to counter sabotage and terrorist threats.