Protection of important ground facilities from air terrorism.

Protection of important ground facilities from air terrorism.

SHCHERBAKOV Grigory Nikolaevich, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor
SHLYKOV Yuri Aleksandrovich, Candidate of Technical Sciences

An article [2] was previously published on the problem of protecting an important state facility from terrorism.

The appearance of this article is due to the presence of weak links in the system of protecting important facilities from water areas, checkpoints and air.

The purpose of this article is to formulate a comprehensive problem of counteracting air terrorism, which, in the opinion of the authors, is a «blank spot» on the security map of important facilities both in Russia and in other countries.

The threat of terrorism throughout the world requires improving the methods and means of counteracting it [1].

The events of September 11, 2001 in the United States showed that a terrorist threat to ground facilities can come from the air.

We also know what catastrophic consequences an accident can lead to, for example, the events at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.

At the same time, the limited capabilities of modern air defense were demonstrated by the scandalous flight of Rust in a light single-engine aircraft from the territory of the FRG to its landing on Red Square in Moscow.

Moreover, it is known that a significant part of this flight was carried out at low altitudes.

In order for saboteurs to penetrate the territory of an important ground facility by air or to drop an explosive device, ultra-small aircraft, hang gliders and other small aircraft (LA) can be used [2, 3].

Recently, various radio-controlled unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with gasoline or electric engines have become widespread.

They are usually made in two versions: as a mini-airplane or a mini-helicopter.

Their payload can range from tens of grams to tens of kilograms.

Small aircraft usually fly at low altitudes — from 10 — 20 to several hundred meters.

It has long been known that combating such low-altitude targets with existing air defense systems is greatly complicated by the influence of the underlying surface inhomogeneities [4, 6].

It is especially difficult to counter them at altitudes of up to 50 m.

In addition, a small aircraft can be delivered disassembled by car directly to the protected facility, where it can be quickly disassembled and used for terrorist purposes.

Thus, the development of modern technology has led to the emergence of a new terrorist threat — using small aircraft and UAVs.

Modern methods and means do not fully meet the new requirements for protecting objects from the air.

The relevance of the problem of protecting an important ground object from air terrorism is obvious.

The seriousness and complexity of approaches to this problem are due to the need to solve several interrelated issues.

The main ones are:

• organizational, caused by the need for interaction between various agencies and departments; legal, requiring the creation of new legal foundations in the area of ​​the use of non-lethal weapons in peacetime, an increase in land allocation for protected areas near the protected facility, etc.; technical — due to the insufficient effectiveness of means of countering the terrorist threat from the air;
• economic, caused by significant costs for the creation of new anti-terrorist equipment and its operation.

When considering the latter issue, it is necessary not only to take into account the costs of its solution, but also to remember the possible enormous material and political consequences of a terrorist attack on nuclear power plants, hydroelectric power plants, large military arsenals with ammunition and other important facilities.

It would be fair to note that the problem has a history.

This article does not aim to consider this aspect, but a few words must be said.

It is known that the simplest anti-aircraft air barriers in the form of tethered balloons were used back in the First and Second World Wars around important objects (cities, military factories, etc.) — Their use has fully justified itself. And in our case, their use is not excluded. First of all, in areas with complex relief, where there are areas of radar invisibility.

The expected enemy is an aircraft (manned — SSN or unmanned — UAV) or a group target. Defense against the actions of such an aircraft includes three probable and sequential measures: detection, warning, destruction.

Fig. 1. Scheme of protection of a ground object from an air terrorist threat

However, given the real situation — peacetime, political and legal aspects, administrative-territorial features, etc., it seems advisable to first preliminarily classify the air terrorist and propose a specific methodology for making a decision to counter him.

Figure 1 shows a variant of the scheme for protecting an important ground facility from an air terrorist threat. A zonal arrangement of the countermeasure complex is proposed.

In this case, when an intruder invades from the air, the degree of impact on him after detection increases as he approaches the protected facility.

The central place in the protection and defense system of an important ground facility is occupied by the command post (CP). It includes a set of long-range detection systems (based on a Doppler radar with a range of up to 15 — 20 km), target designation and beam effects on identified low-altitude air targets. The command post receives all information about the surrounding situation, based on the analysis of which a decision is made on the use of certain forces and means to prevent a terrorist act.

Source: magazine «Special Equipment» No. 1 2008