ON THE QUESTION OF CONSTRUCTING THE RADIATION BRANCH OF THE INTEGRATED SECURITY SYSTEM..

ON THE QUESTION OF BUILDING THE RADIATION BRANCH OF THE INTEGRATED SECURITY SYSTEM..

ON THE QUESTION OF CONSTRUCTING THE RADIATION BRANCH OF THE INTEGRATED SECURITY SYSTEM

Protection against the possible use of radioactive substances in terrorist attacks, as one of the tasks of the integrated security system of state-important facilities – administrative buildings, banks, airports, railway stations, sea ports, etc. – has recently acquired an extremely high relevance. Terrorist attacks with the use of radioactive substances are no longer hypothetical, the fact of the emergence of a new type of terror – radiation or nuclear – is recognized.

Since the use of radioactive substances by terrorists entails serious consequences, special attention has been paid to issues of radiation safety within the integrated system. Thus, in work [1], radiation control is considered as a mandatory part of inspection control, and in work [2], the author raises the problems of postal receipt control. Issues of methodological support and technical equipment of security services, in the context of counteracting nuclear terrorism, are considered in work [3].

However, experience in ensuring radiation safety at radiation-hazardous facilities shows that building an effective protection and safety system requires a comprehensive approach. The radiation branch of the integrated safety system should include all types of monitoring — source, environment and human [4, 5]. Functionally, the radiation branch should be focused on ensuring protection from damage to health and/or disruption of the work of a specific person, the facility's personnel as a whole and the detection of accidental radioactive sources.

The place of the radiation branch in the structure of the integrated security system is determined as follows. The general structure of the integrated security system of the facility can be represented as three protective barriers [6]. The first (external) barrier is implemented by engineering security means, various mechanical barriers. The second consists of technical security means, which include subsystems of security, fire alarm, television surveillance; access control; radiation safety (radiation branch) [7]; information protection. The third barrier is implemented by various organizational measures, characterized by the method of construction and tactics of interaction of internal and external (for banks — non-departmental) security services.

Analysis of probable channels for the delivery of terrorist weapons and possible options for the use of radioactive substances allows us to determine the structure and scope of measurement tasks. Delivery channels include checkpoints, cargo terminals, water supply and ventilation systems. Cargo terminals should include all possible ones, including postal and food terminals.

Radioactive substances of various nuclide compositions and aggregate states may be used in terrorist attacks. These may be all kinds of radioactive waste – spent fuel from nuclear power plants, waste from vehicles with nuclear power plants, equipment with sources of ionizing radiation, medical preparations, etc.

Solid sources of ionizing radiation can be used in the form of direct embedding. The source can be camouflaged, built into furniture or interior items, a car. In this case, the most likely sources are photon and/or neutron radiation, although in principle the goals of a terrorist attack can be achieved by a beta- or alpha-emitting source, or a combination of them. Radioactive powders and solutions can become a component of any mixture used in construction and repair, or an “additive” to food. Getting finely dispersed powders of thorium, uranium and plutonium into the ventilation system can lead to the formation of a highly active aerosol curtain in the air of the premises, which poses a serious threat to personnel through inhalation.

Radioactive substances can be used as highly toxic chemical weapons. 87Rb, 115In, 144Nd, 147Sm, 187Re, U and Pu isotopes have high chemical toxicity. For example, Pu entering human internal organs leads to chemical poisoning (1 mg of plutonium is a lethal dose), radiation damage to the gastrointestinal tract, kidneys, liver, and brain. It should be noted that the maximum permissible concentrations of Pu239 and U238 are determined based on their chemical toxicity [8].

Solutions containing radionuclides are usually prepared using HCl, HNO3 acids and water. Modern radiochemical methods allow creating radioactive solutions with a high degree of accuracy in dosing a specific radionuclide. In addition, liquid radioactive waste should not be overlooked — these are organic and inorganic liquids, pulps and sludges, in which the specific activity of radionuclides can exceed permissible standards by tens of times. If radioactive solutions enter the water supply system, the normal functioning of government and administrative institutions can be paralyzed for a long time, as well as life in populated areas.

Radioactive aerosols are highly dispersed formations (particle size less than 0.5 μm). Natural and artificial aerosols enter the human body through the respiratory system. The inhalation route of radionuclides entering the body is recognized as one of the most important and dangerous [9 – 12].

Dangerous concentrations of radioactive aerosols in the atmosphere of premises can be created in various ways. This can be waste containing radionuclides of the uranium and/or thorium family. In the process of their radioactive decay, noble gases are formed — radon, thoron and actinon. The daughter products of the decay of these gases as a result of deposition on particles suspended in the air form radioactive aerosols. Highly dispersed powders of uranium, plutonium can be sprayed through the ventilation system.

Based on the above, the structure of the radiation branch of the integrated security system can be schematically represented as follows (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1. Structure of the radiation branch of the ISS

Source monitoring in the radiation branch structure includes one main task – searching for radioactive substances. The search should be carried out at checkpoints and cargo terminals. The basic solution to the problem is stationary radiation monitors that detect radioactive substances in automatic mode. Radiation monitors continuously monitor the flow of people, transport and cargo. At checkpoints, radiation monitors are usually installed together with metal detectors. To solve this problem, the Scientific Research Center “SNIIP” developed two modifications of monitors “Vympel” and RIG-08P [13 – 15]. Radiation monitors ensure monitoring of large objects. A more thorough search for unevenly distributed radioactive substances is carried out using portable radiometers-dosimeters IRD-02, MS-04 [16], as well as wearable radiometers-dosimeters RZS-10N [14]. The use of these devices allows for a differentiated assessment of the distribution of activity levels. In addition, the devices solve the problem of localizing radioactive substances. The IRD-02 (photo 1) and MS-04 devices are developed on the basis of end-face gas-discharge counters, which allows for operational monitoring of the radiation situation and the search for radioactive substances by photon and beta radiation. The RZS-10N device uses a scintillation counter sensitive to photon and beta radiation.

Photo 1. Portable
radiometer-dosimeter IRD-02

Monitoring of a person in the structure of the radiation branch of the integrated security system is represented by the task of personal inspection of people at checkpoints. If there is a need for a thorough inspection, as well as in the case of inspection using metal detectors, personal radiation inspection of a person can be carried out using portable radiometers-dosimeters IRD-02, MS-04 and RZS-10N.

Environmental monitoring in the structure of the radiation branch of the integrated security system includes the tasks of operational control of the radiation situation and search for radioactive sources in the premises of the facility, operational aerosol control of the atmosphere of the premises and filters of the ventilation system, as well as control of water and alpha-active gases. Portable radiometers-dosimeters allow you to control the radiation situation in the premises of the facility, scan workplaces for the detection of radioactive substances.

The radiometers “Alpha-3” (photo 2) and “REKS-1” (photo 3) solve the problems of aerosol monitoring of the air environment [17]. They allow detecting artificial aerosols against the background of natural ones, and during joint measurements, selecting aerosols by type of radiation. In addition, with the help of radiometers, it is possible to evaluate the alpha and beta activity of filters used in the ventilation system. Alpha-active gases are monitored by the RGA-06P radiometer, which is designed to measure the volumetric activity of radon and thoron directly by alpha radiation.

Photo 2. Radiometer “Alpha-3”

Photo 3. Radiometer “REKS-1”

Water control can be provided by the radiometer RZhB-11P, the use of which involves sampling. To ensure continuous automatic control of the water supply system, flow devices and detection units UDZhG-35R and BDZhB-19P are used. The above-mentioned water control equipment is partially described in the work [18].

In conclusion, the author expresses gratitude to Yu. P. Fedorovsky, S. V. Kozlov and B. V. Polenov for discussions, provided material and valuable recommendations made during the work.

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