Keith Melton and his spy equipment museum.
Vadim Antonovich Shelkov
Keith Melton and his spy equipment museum.
Eavesdropping devices
It seems to me that the desire to learn someone's secrets is inherent in human nature itself. Whatever they say, but eavesdropping on other people's conversations, despite all the reprehensibility of this activity, has always been very attractive.
The ability to forestall the actions of an enemy, for example, the leader of a neighboring tribe, to learn the plans of a competitor, and finally, to neutralize someone's intrigues — isn't this the cherished dream of any politician, businessman or just ordinary person! And it is still a question which of the professions (after the plowman and the cattle breeder) was the most ancient…
For this reason, gaining access to classified information has always been the main task of any intelligence service. It is understandable why the intelligence services of the world's leading countries spend huge amounts of money on creating devices that allow them to listen in on enemy conversations. Advances in radio technology and, especially, microelectronics have made it possible to solve this problem in the best possible way. Microscopic microphones are supplemented by miniature amplifiers, transmitters or tape recorders, and other devices help intercept signals from telephone wires. In many cases, such equipment also includes portable magnetic sound recording devices for recording useful information.
However, any eavesdropping operation only makes sense if the appropriate device («bug») is placed in the room where the information of interest to intelligence «circulates.»
Special devices have been developed for the quick and unnoticeable installation of such devices, and technical service personnel have undergone special training.
As a rule, information obtained using eavesdropping equipment is transmitted to the control point by radio.
The signal from the radio transmitter carrying information from the hidden microphone must be strong enough to reach the control point, but at the same time very weak to make it difficult to detect using the simplest means of searching for “bugs”.
For example, there are listening devices that accumulate useful information in digital memory devices and, at the right time, “shoot” it in a matter of seconds towards the checkpoint.
In other cases, an intelligence officer or agent records conversations of interest to him using equipment placed under his clothes. An example of such a device is the “Mezon” tape recorder, created at one time by KGB specialists. In it, sound recording was carried out not on magnetic tape, but on ultra-thin steel wire.
“Bugs” in electrical connectors
Various electrical connectors, sockets, plugs, etc. are an excellent place to place eavesdropping devices. Since they are already connected to the electrical network by their main purpose, the operating time of such devices is practically unlimited (until they are discovered by the security service).
Miniature eavesdropping equipment.
Many miniature parts and units of radio equipment were specially developed for the creation of spy equipment:
- A telephone handset microphone with a built-in transmitter.
- A general-purpose radio microphone (“bug”), small enough to be hidden almost anywhere.
- A device for eavesdropping on conversations through a wall. It consists of a microphone with an amplifier and a plastic sound tube, which makes it difficult to detect with a metal detector.
A set for laying thin microphone wires.
At one time, American specialists created a special set of tools.
It allowed you to covertly lay thin microphone wires in plaster, other loose building materials, as well as cracks and crevices.
During the laying of the wires, a special electrical circuit monitored their integrity and sent a corresponding signal if they were broken.
Eavesdropping devices in the form of a pen and a book
After the Second World War, thanks to the rapid development of microelectronics, eavesdropping microphones disguised in ordinary pens appeared in the intelligence arsenal, allowing agents to secretly record the content of important conversations.
Another clever device could easily fit into the spine of an ordinary book of average thickness.
Such a book could be placed on a shelf in a room of interest to intelligence without much suspicion.
The examples given here are typical for the 1960s.
These days, thanks to the use of modern technology, eavesdropping devices have become even more miniature.
Induction interception of telephone conversations
Such a device can be connected to any telephone line. Both speaking parties are clearly heard. The information received is transmitted via radio or recorded on tape. Since inductive connection is carried out without any physical contact with the conductors of the telephone cable, it is very difficult to detect.
The First Miniature “Bugs”
The photograph shows a demonstration model of an American electrical socket with a listening device installed in it (it can be seen in the transparent case). Another photograph shows a network adapter from the 1960s, which was used by operational technology specialists to eavesdrop on conversations.
Microphone in a belt buckle
A miniature microphone installed in a belt buckle made it possible to intercept conversations of interest to the intelligence officer through a small hole. The microphone was connected to a radio transmitter or portable tape recorder, which were hidden under the agent's clothing.
The Thing — “veshchitsa”
In the early 1950s, an unusual eavesdropping device was discovered in the American embassy building in Moscow. When the American ambassador publicly demonstrated it at the UN in May 1960, it attracted enormous public attention. “The Thing is a metal cylinder hidden in the body of a carved wooden coat of arms of the United States.
At one time it was presented to the American ambassador in Moscow. Without thinking twice, the gift was placed on the wall of his office, right above the ambassador's desk!
The coat of arms depicts a bald eagle, with a hole drilled right under its beak, allowing sound waves to reach the listening device. At first, American specialists were simply discouraged, unable to determine how it worked: it had no power sources (?!), and the usual radio components were completely absent.
This incomprehensible find was quite symbolically dubbed The Thing — “little thing” or “something” (quite suitable for the title of a modern horror film about an alien invasion!).
And only Peter Wright, an outstanding English specialist in special equipment, managed to reveal the operating principle of this “thing”. Subsequently, the British secret service reproduced a copy of this device under the name “Satyr” for use by both British and American intelligence.
How the “thing” worked
A high-frequency “radio beam” was directed from the neighboring building toward the antenna of the listening device installed in the coat of arms. The sound waves accompanying the conversations in the American ambassador’s office caused vibrations in the membrane covering the metal cylinder. As a result, the electrical capacity between this membrane and a special tuning screw changed. These changes led to the modulation of the reflected “radio beam” by the specified sound signal. At the receiving point, this signal was received and processed.
Peter Wright
Peter Wright (1916 – 1995) was a leading technical specialist of the British secret service MI-5 from 1955. During the Second World War, he was engaged in scientific work. He managed to create special listening devices for various conditions of their use.
It was Peter Wright who studied the original Soviet-made listening device found in the American embassy, the famous The Thing –“A thing (or “something,” if you will) found inside a decorative wooden US coat of arms. Peter Wright was the first Western specialist to figure out how it worked. Despite the lack of specialized education, Peter Wright was a brilliant inventor who tirelessly found original solutions to the problems facing the British counterintelligence service MI5. Subsequently, having demonstrated extraordinary abilities in many areas, he transferred to Division D, which was responsible for countering Soviet intelligence. Over time, Peter Wright became assistant director of MI5.
And here is what Peter Wright himself writes in his infamous book “Spy Catcher, The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer, Peter Wright with Paul Greengrass, Viking Penguin Inc. 1987):
“In 1951, before the US Secretary of State’s visit to Moscow, US State Department technicians were conducting a routine check of their ambassador’s office. They were using a standard tunable signal generator to detect eavesdropping devices.
An acoustic lock-on effect was detected at 1800 MHz. To their great surprise, an unusual device was found in the wooden decorative US seal that hung above the ambassador’s desk. However, the tuning of this “thing”, as it was dubbed at the time, was very unstable.”
The bewildered Americans turned to their English colleagues for help in trying to figure out how it actually worked. Peter Wright was given a device wrapped in a cotton napkin and packed in a wooden box, which apparently had previously contained chess pieces. It was cylindrical in shape and, together with the antenna, was 20 cm long. Inside the cylinder was a small metal screw in the form of a mushroom with a flat top for tuning the entire device (apparently by changing the electrical capacity). Behind the «mushroom» was a torn thin diaphragm, which played the role of a microphone membrane. The confused Americans said that one of their «specialists» accidentally pierced it with his finger.
It took Peter Wright more than ten weeks of hard work to repair the device and determine how it worked. From the marks on the metal cylinder, it was clear that the Russians had used some kind of special tool to install the device into the body of the coat of arms. And a special conductor was used to install the diaphragm-membrane. Despite the difficulties, Peter Wright still managed to restore the diaphragm.
Then he clarified the principle of the thing’s operation.” It turns out that previous attempts had led everyone astray. By changing the setting of the mushroom capacitor, Peter Wright made the “thing” work. The true tuning frequency turned out to be 800 MHz. His delight knew no bounds. This was immediately reported to the leadership of the MI-5 secret service and the American representatives who were closely monitoring the progress of the work.
Since all this happened in 1951, immediately after the escape of Soviet agents Burgess and Maclean, such an excuse to «bite» their American colleagues was very convenient.
When asked how long it would take to replicate the «thing», Peter Wright replied: «At least a year». After 18 months, the British managed to make a prototype, which was codenamed «Satir». It was immediately demonstrated to Roger Hollis, the future head of British counterintelligence. Tests of the «Satir» device were carried out directly in his office. The device turned out to be so sensitive that not only speech could be heard, but also the sounds of a key turning in a door lock.
«Excellent, Peter,» Hollis noted, «it's just black magic.»
«Satir» turned out to be a very successful product indeed. The Americans immediately ordered 12 sets, and then, having brazenly copied the design, made another 20. Throughout the 1950s, the new equipment was actively used by British, American, Canadian and Australian intelligence agencies for covert information gathering. But the most important thing for Peter Wright was his establishment as an authoritative specialist in the MI5 structure.
Eavesdropping device in furniture elements
“Bugs” can be hidden in fake furniture elements that are installed instead of the original parts. Similar wooden blocks, shown in the illustrations, contain microphones, radio transmitters and power batteries. The first was installed in a desk by Czech specialists, and the second was used by American intelligence agencies and could be adapted for various situations encountered in practice.
“Bug” in a network adapter
This device, consisting of a microphone and a radio transmitter, installed in a network adapter of English manufacture, has an unlimited service life. There is no need to monitor the state of batteries, since the “bug” is powered directly from the electrical network. A significant disadvantage of this device is that it is constantly in working order and emits a signal into the air. This allows counterintelligence services to easily detect it.
Eavesdropping on phones using a quickly installed device
Such a telephone “bug” could be installed in a matter of minutes and was used in cases where there was no time to install a more complex device. It did not require any batteries to operate, since it was powered by the telephone line itself. But since the parts of such a listening device are not functional elements of the telephone set, it is easy to detect even with a cursory examination of the telephone set.
Equipment for receiving and recording signals.
As already noted, listening to and recording various conversations and negotiations is an important component of intelligence work. In most cases, the final product is a magnetic tape. Usually, listening devices hidden in household items, furniture and building structures are directly connected to the recording device or transmit a signal by radio to a control point located at some distance.
Thus, two categories of hearing control equipment can be distinguished:
- the first represents the actual equipment of the checkpoint — radio receivers, tape recorders and other equipment.
- the second consists of devices that the scout or agent takes with him to the meeting to record the negotiations directly on the spot. These are mainly miniature tape recorders and microphones.
Checkpoint radio receiver.
This portable radio receiver was developed in the USA in the 60s. It was used to receive signals from nearby bugs. The output signal was transmitted via cable to a tape recorder or other equipment.
Microphone in a wristwatch
This microphone, hidden in the watch, was connected by a thin cable to a recording device placed on the employee's body. Similar watches were noticed by Soviet counterintelligence agents on the American «diplomat» who came to the aid of Martha Peterson, who was arrested in Moscow in July 1977. The fact is that Martha was a liaison for Alexander Ogorodnik, an employee of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recruited by the CIA in 1974.
Microphone in a wristwatch. It was connected by a thin cable to a tape recorder placed on the employee's body.
When detained, A. Ogorodnik managed to commit suicide by taking poison (this plot was used by Yulian Semenov in his novel «TASS is Authorized to Declare»).
Martha Peterson was expelled from the USSR, and the microphone in the watch ended up in the Keith Melton Museum
A microphone in a pen.
KGB agents sometimes used miniature microphones hidden in the cap of a pen. This allowed them to record the content of a conversation. The audio signal was transmitted to a checkpoint using a special miniature transmitter or recorded by a small tape recorder placed under clothing. Depending on the type of clothing, different types of caps were used.
“Motel Kit.”
The basis of this set was a contact microphone – a practical analogue of a medical stethoscope. It was firmly glued or pressed to the wall or door of an adjacent room and allowed the agent to intercept conversations of neighbors. The contact microphone received sound vibrations and converted them into electrical signals. After amplification and filtering of background noise, these signals were recorded on a tape recorder or listened to using headphones.
Sound recording device Meson”.
The special tape recorder “Mezon”, which dates back to the 70s, recorded information not on magnetic tape, but on a metal wire 50 microns thick. Numerous accessories were also created for using the device in various situations. It could be controlled using a remote switch hidden in a pocket. There was an adapter for recording telephone conversations. Electrical connectors with threaded fastening ensured a reliable connection of contacts. Special belts allowed the device to be discreetly placed under clothing.
SK-8A — a control point in an attaché case.
This ordinary-looking American attaché case concealed a whole set of special equipment:
- a receiver of signals from eavesdropping devices
- a tape recorder for long recording (up to 6 hours)
- an amplifier with automatic gain control
- an information transmitter
The suitcase itself could also be used as a kind of “bug” for auditory monitoring of the premises. An intelligence officer or agent would leave the suitcase for a while and leave the premises under a plausible pretext. During his absence, the equipment contained in the suitcase monitored all negotiations in this office.
Fake pager with hidden tape recorder
The photograph shows a device made in the US in the 90s that imitates a pager. It contains a miniature tape recorder with a microphone. The “pager” was worn on a belt and controlled by a switch on the back of the device.