Industrial espionage in Russia. Methods and means.

Industrial espionage in Russia. Methods and means.

Lysov A.V., Ostapenko A.N.

INTRODUCTION

Industrial espionage has always existed, at least since the time of Prometheus, who carried out the unauthorized transfer of top secret technology for producing fire to humans, which later led to space travel. Man has always sought to know as much as possible about his neighbors.

In our post-industrial era, information has acquired a decisive role.
In most industrially developed countries, information is the basis of all aspects of society's development. The advantage and specificity of information is that it does not disappear when consumed, is not completely transferred when exchanged (remaining in the information system and with the user), is «indivisible», i.e. it makes sense only with a sufficiently complete set of information, and that its quality increases with the addition of new information.

Indeed, a society whose scientific, technical, industrial, practical and theoretical activities are based on rapidly accumulated, intelligently used information, in principle receives at its disposal resources of enormous significance, accessible for multiple and multifaceted use, further «renewal» in an improved form and rapid creation of new information systems.

Information is, firstly, knowledge of a relatively new type, suitable for further use, and, secondly, knowledge, production, storage and application of which is really becoming an increasingly important activity for society, giving rise to corresponding technical and organizational structures [1]. One of such structures is organizations engaged in the unauthorized acquisition of information for the purpose of making a profit, that is, industrial espionage.

True, in this area, humanity has accumulated significant experience.
The earliest sources of information in the age when man believed in the intervention of supernatural powers in his affairs were prophets, seers, oracles, soothsayers and astrologers. If the gods knew in advance what would happen in the future — since they themselves to a certain extent predetermined the course of events — it was logical to look for indications of divine intentions in the revelations of holy men, in the riddles of oracles, in the arrangement of the stars, and often in dreams.

The Greeks, with their rather pessimistic views of man's relations with the gods, seem to have gotten into trouble even when they received warning information from the gods, since such information was laced with such a large dose of mystery and contradiction that it became either ambiguous or completely incomprehensible. Here was the beginning of the use of such a powerful weapon as disinformation.

By 400 B.C., the East had greatly outstripped the West in the art of intelligence. Sun Tzu wrote: «What is called foreknowledge cannot be obtained from spirits or gods» or by calculation. It must be obtained from people familiar with the enemy's situation.» [2]This was the beginning of espionage, including industrial espionage. Many sovereigns and private individuals were very successful in it. A well-organized intelligence service helped the merchants of Venice and the banking house of Fugger, the Krupp firm and the house of Rothschild.

The methods remained virtually unchanged for centuries: they bribed, blackmailed, sent ambassadors-spies, intercepted letters, read parchments (later books and newspapers) in libraries and monasteries. When they could, they spied and eavesdropped.

Difficulties arose even then: it was necessary to transmit the received information to the collection and processing center.

To do this, it was necessary to send not always reliable messengers, personally run a marathon distance or use pigeon post.

And in order not to forget along the way what was being discussed, the content of intercepted conversations was recorded, and sometimes encrypted.

Thus, we see the prototype of a technical system for collecting information:

• microphone, camera, camera — the ear or eyes of a spy;
• dictaphone or information accumulation system — notes;
• radio channel, wires, etc. — messenger;
• receiver — the person who took the message from the messenger.

As for the analysis of the information received, everything has remained unchanged — a person or group of people who can think are needed. The only thing is that their work has now been somewhat simplified by a computer.
The development of technology until the beginning of the 20th century did not affect the means of unauthorized information retrieval: they drilled holes in walls and ceilings, used secret passages and translucent mirrors, settled near keyholes and under windows. The advent of the telegraph and telephone made it possible to use technical means of obtaining information. A gigantic number of messages began to be intercepted, influencing the conduct of wars and the situation on the stock exchange. In the 30-40s, dictaphones, truly miniature cameras and various radio microphones appeared. In the future, the interception of data processed in computers acquired increasing importance, but traditional means were also improved. This small book is mainly devoted to them.

As for Russia, before the revolution we had a fairly developed market for services to obtain information about competitors [3], fortunately there were enough retired «professionals» from the effectively functioning secret police.
In Soviet Russia, commercial secrecy was officially abolished by the Regulation on Workers' Control, adopted by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in November 1917. Instead of a market, a distribution system was introduced, competition was replaced by socialist competition, and all citizens were required to exchange experiences [4]. Thousands of people guarded state and military secrets, and the West could only envy the effectiveness of foreign intelligence.

The development of market relations, the collapse of the system of strict control over the production of special equipment and its import into the country through official and unofficial channels, the departure of professionals from the former KGB, as well as the GRU and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, led to the revival of industrial espionage in Russia in literally two or three years. And the numerous «professionals», acting cautiously and effectively, were joined by amateur spies who had read detective stories. The employees of the «PPSh Laboratory» had to deal with former chemical engineers, musicians, and students who imagined themselves to be James Bonds. And mafia groups have recently been paying more and more attention to obtaining information through technical channels. For this purpose, small organizations are created from trusted people, for whose training and equipment they do not skimp.

Many security services of commercial structures successfully carry out operations to introduce people and equipment to competitors.

They are forced to strictly control their employees in order to prevent leakage of information about their own secrets. We must not forget that Russia's integration into international organizations, participation in international projects, and colossal technological and scientific groundwork in a number of areas make domestic entrepreneurs the object of close attention from private and state intelligence services of the West and the East.

How government structures work can be illustrated by the example of the Military-Industrial Commission (MIC).

The MIC had a number of tasks:

1. collecting applications from various ministries related to the military industry;
2. developing an intelligence plan for the year based on these applications;
3. transferring this plan to various intelligence agencies (KGB, GRU, intelligence services of Eastern European countries, etc.);
4. collecting data obtained by intelligence services over the year;
5. calculation of savings in industry and research activities.

The All-Union Institute of Inter-Industry Information (VIMI), a kind of transmission between industry and intelligence agencies, helped her monitor the implementation of the plan. The highest leadership was carried out by the Politburo and the Central Committee of the CPSU. The annual intelligence plan was approved personally by the General Secretary.
In the KGB, the task of obtaining «special information» was assigned to the «T» department of the First Main Directorate. This department was engaged, in particular, in intelligence activities in the field of the nuclear industry, military and space rocket production, cybernetics and general industrial technology.

The work was carried out in close cooperation with the intelligence services of Eastern European countries, with which the «D» department maintained constant ties.

The KGB's «T» department sent an intelligence plan to each residency. The officers of «Line X» were tasked with carrying out all the instructions of the plan. It was a voluminous album and was kept at the embassy. In turn, the GRU had an «operational department», namely, the «department of scientific and technical intelligence», whose task was to collect scientific information that was used in the military sphere.
Each year, a special fund of about 12 billion francs was allocated to the military-industrial complex to finance specific operations to collect information on Western technology. These funds were provided by specific customers, that is, industries [5].

The United States is not far behind. For the first time in history, the activities of the entire intelligence community have been united under the CIA. Around 100 billion dollars have been allocated for the technical re-equipment of American intelligence by the year 2000. All this is no accident, since the intelligence agencies are tasked with monitoring the implementation of economic agreements, identifying illegal economic practices and actions that are detrimental to the interests of the United States, assessing reserves of raw materials and new trade strategies, and possible breakthroughs in technology. The range of requirements for intelligence is very wide: from the analysis of general trends to the study of individual contracts [6]. In principle, the issue of transferring the information obtained to individuals and organizations has been resolved.
Almost all corporations operate in the same way as intelligence services in collecting information, only on a more modest scale, since this is an indispensable condition for their survival in the face of fierce competition.

The purpose of this book is to familiarize a wide range of readers with some methods and means of obtaining information that are actually used or may be used in the near future in Russia.

1. OPEN SOURCES

Information about companies and individuals is collected in a variety of ways, most of which are not secret or confidential. This applies primarily to open information, that is, information obtained from newspapers, books, scientific and technical publications, official reports and advertising materials. Most intelligence agencies in the world operate in a similar manner. Such activities are carried out on a broad and thorough basis, while it is necessary not to miss anything that is available and that could be useful. It is clear that analysis requires a group of analysts capable of catching a «goldfish» from a sea of ​​documents.
Other, no less important areas for obtaining open access to confidential information are [7-8]:

• presentations at conferences, symposia, etc.;
• questions carefully asked by competitor's specialists at these events;
• attempts to invite specialists to work and for this purpose their filling out special questionnaires;
• conversations with employees of competing firms (without breaking the law);
• hiring an employee of a competing firm to obtain the required information;
• studying exhibition samples;
• feigned negotiations with a competitor, allegedly to acquire a license or for joint activities.

All these methods, long used in the West, are also used in our country, only in the most simplified forms. As security services with serious analytical departments are established, provided that specialists from intelligence are attracted and subsequently adapted to Russian procedures, legal sources of information will take their rightful place in the data collection system.
In its reports, the aforementioned military-industrial complex emphasized that 90% of the hundreds of thousands of documents received annually were not secret. Every year, for example, the State Committee for Science and Technology acquired one and a half million Western scientific and technical journals. All of these publications were studied with the greatest attention. The American weekly Aviation Weekend and Space Technology, which was especially valued, was sent to the USSR on Aeroflot planes, and was translated during the flight.
The military-industrial complex paid great attention to all international fairs and exhibitions where one could obtain some useful technical documentation. Every year, about three and a half thousand Soviet specialists were sent abroad (two thousand to the USA). Thus, in the period from 1979 to 1981, Soviet specialists took part in 35 international scientific forums. In its reports, the military-industrial complex noted that the information obtained in this way allowed saving millions of rubles on scientific research, which is equivalent to three years of work by a group of a hundred scientists. The USA tried to estimate the damage caused to their army by Soviet intelligence: 20 billion dollars. This is the amount that Washington must invest in order to nullify the successes of the Soviet defense industry, achieved only thanks to the acquisition of Western technologies [5].
An element of espionage is present in any economic exchange, says Ion Pacepa, a Romanian intelligence officer. «Any contract with any company was used to plant agents.» Thus, in the late 1970s, a cooperation agreement was concluded with the Citroen company. More than 150 Romanian engineers and technicians went to France to familiarize themselves with the new car model. The information brought to Romania made it possible to familiarize themselves with industrial secrets that Citroen did not want to include in the agreement.
Lest one get the impression that industrial espionage was only carried out by the Soviet bloc, here are some other examples. The CIA warned dozens of aerospace companies that French intelligence agents were hunting for their industrial secrets, which ultimately led to the American boycott of the Paris Air Show. According to the United States, France uses its intelligence for industrial espionage in order to help national companies. Japan and South Korea behave similarly [9]. In Russia, open information is collected by the intelligence services of almost all countries (and the young Baltic intelligence services have also joined in) in the interests of private and public structures. Corporations are not far behind the intelligence services.
Among private firms in Germany, the economic information department at the Flick concern stood out. By hook or by crook, they collected and analyzed reports from competitors. All the data obtained was systematized. In addition, information was collected on all the most important shareholders and managers. Such painstaking work was usually rewarded a hundredfold.
For example, an employee of the Chrysler company accidentally learned that Ford's best photographer was in Paris. At first glance, there was nothing unusual about this. However, the relevant services contacted the Chrysler representative office in Paris and found out that Ford was going to photograph the new model against the backdrop of the Eiffel Tower. It also turned out that after the shooting, the photographer was going to Hong Kong. Having received the necessary information, the experts concluded that Ford was planning to release a so-called world car in the coming years, compact, inexpensive, highly standardized, suitable for all regions of the world. Accordingly, Chrysler began to build its strategy [10]. Hundreds of similar examples can be cited. Here is a banal case from our reality. A truck driver from a young company shared with a neighbor in the parking lot that after a long break he had been paid his salary for the last three months. The organization «guardian» of the company immediately concluded that the issue of obtaining a loan had been resolved positively.
At the same time, it must be understood that it is easy to collect open information, but it is no less easy to slip misinformation into it. For this reason, covert information gathering (espionage) will remain an important activity [2].

2. PEOPLE

Among the sources of confidential information, people occupy a special place, because they are capable of acting not only as holders of confidential information, but also as subjects of malicious actions. People are holders and disseminators of information within the framework of their functional duties. In addition to possessing information, people are capable of analyzing it, generalizing it, drawing conclusions, and also, under certain conditions, hiding, stealing, selling information and committing other criminal acts, including entering into criminal relations with criminals [11].
It is extremely rare for an industrial espionage specialist to break a lock and enter a company under cover of night in order to install a listening device. Only special services with legal cover and newbies who have read a lot of books work this way. An experienced person, understanding what he is risking, tries to either legally enter the premises of interest to him (by getting a job, making a business visit, with a team of repairmen, etc.), or recruit an agent from among the employees and service personnel.
A fairly complex process is identifying a candidate for an agent, i.e. an activity aimed at finding potential agents and identifying their potential capabilities. Next comes the development and evaluation of the candidate, which means studying his personal qualities and abilities, as well as determining the methods for his most effective use. After the decision to use a person as an agent, recruitment is carried out on the basis of blackmail, bribery, ideological considerations, personal rejection of the company's management, etc.Very often the agent does not know for whom he is working, or is given incorrect information. Later, when financial and other means of control are in force, the recruit is told the identity of the true master. The CIA believes that more effective control over agents can be achieved through persuasion rather than threats, and case officers strive to develop friendly relations with him [12].
Each organization has its own tactics. Thus, the British company «Securicor», which is actively working on the Russian market, as its director George Blanch claimed, «sends» its man into the company as an assistant manager. He has to perform his official functions quite carefully until he solves the task set before him, otherwise he will be quickly exposed. When the question arises of how to remove him, then an arrest is staged, or they simply simulate illness or dismissal [10]. This technique is especially good when there is a struggle between several clans in the company, or it is necessary to control some of its employees.
Very often, such a rather long-term scheme is not used in Russia. Basically, direct bribery or blackmail is used. The fact is that, as a rule, one-time operations are carried out, and no one cares about the agent's further fate. However, in cases where systematic control over the company's activities is involved, it is important to deal with a permanent agent.
Most agents do not have all the information, especially service personnel. In this case, they are used to legally enter the premises and install listening devices, study the contents of trash cans, etc. It is clear that it is better to entrust the collection of information to specialists in the field of interest, as, for example, Dr. Bradley did [13]. As a professor at the Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute, he selected the most talented students and helped them get jobs in leading corporations. They did not lose contact with their boss and supplied him with the necessary information, which he sold with great benefit to himself. In addition, he constantly insisted that his students write their scientific papers based on the analysis of production processes at real chemical plants. Many American companies, carefully guarding secrets from competitors, willingly introduced Bradley's students to the technologies of their production, hoping for good publicity and the opportunity to attract the most talented graduates to their laboratories.Beautiful, charming women in the hands of economic spies are an invaluable asset. Those who cannot be bribed, intoxicated or intimidated blab their secrets to their charming partners. No matter how trivial the trick with a dummy woman is, with some preparation it always works without fail. This weapon will be used for a very long time, and if it does not help, then there is only one thing left: technical intelligence tools.

3. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE MEANS

3. 1. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE MEANS: Interception of a conversation

3. 1. 1. Acoustic signals

Sound or acoustic signals are mechanical vibrations with small amplitudes propagating in an elastic medium.

Eavesdropping

The simplest way to intercept a conversation is ordinary eavesdropping, and very often, accidental. A fairly common situation is when visitors in the reception area can quite clearly hear everything that is happening in the office; in the smoking room, employees of the company, not paying attention to the presence of strangers, continue to discuss important problems; in the summer, meetings, including on the lower floors, are held with open windows or vents. In these situations, as they say, if you don’t want to, you will hear.
Eavesdropping by drilling holes in walls has been known since time immemorial, and is still widely used today. If it is possible to set up a listening post in adjacent rooms, this method will be the cheapest and safest. However, amateurs are not recommended to use it, because it is necessary to choose the right drilling location, depth, and thickness of the hole.

Dictaphone

Nowadays, dictaphones of various types are very common. Many of them are equipped with an acoustomat (automatic shutdown system during pauses in conversation) and a tape speed regulator. As a rule, such dictaphones (SONY, Panasonic, etc.) are used to record conversations by one of the interlocutors. In this case, they are hidden in briefcases, packages, or even just in pockets.
The author has seen dictaphones built into various objects: briefcases, table clocks, and so on. The tactics of use are quite simple, but effective. A briefcase is «absent-mindedly» forgotten in an office or reception area, and watches are given to people whose premises are accessible to trusted people (to change cassettes) — cleaners, security guards, watchmen.
The smallest voice recorder that can be purchased in Russia is Pani, the dimensions of which allow it to be placed in a pack of cigarettes. The price of such a baby is $300…….700.

Microphones

A. Transmission of information via specially laid wires

The simplest and most reliable operation is the use of a special small-sized microphone (7x5x2 mm) and a specially laid wire. It consists of a microphone secretly placed in the room of interest, connected to a listening post, where intercepted conversations are recorded through an amplifier on a tape recorder or listened to. Before the advent of microelectronics, the described method was used extremely widely.
An example is the case described in [2], when the Soviet authorities suspected that one of the embassies was being bugged. In connection with this, they sent a team of laborers to the country in question, providing them with diplomatic passports. The local authorities had a lot of fun watching for several weeks as these «diplomats» in overalls dug a ditch several meters deep around the embassy building with shovels. They were looking for wires buried in the ground, which, in their opinion, should lead from the building to the outside (nothing was found). But often the suspicions were confirmed.
In the house where the families of Soviet diplomats lived in Washington, the rods of the metal ceiling were replaced with hollow tubes containing microphones for listening in on conversations [14].
The disadvantage of wires is the possibility of their detection and verification of purpose during visual and technical control. More modern systems use the thinnest (no thicker than a hair) optical fibers, which can be woven into carpet, etc. Of course, there is no microphone in its usual sense.
Despite the apparent simplicity, experts do not really like such means, since a wire can be used to detect a listening point, with all the unpleasant consequences that entails.

B. Using existing communications

It is much safer to use wires extending beyond the premises for alarms, radio transmission, etc., as well as metal structures such as heating, sewerage, and water supply pipes. A microphone with a preamplifier, covertly installed in the room of interest, is connected to such structures, from which information is collected at the listening point. In this case, more sophisticated equipment is required for both transmitting and receiving acoustic signals. An example is the LST-OS-1 system, the microphone of which is located in the security alarm sensor installed at the facility. The LST-VO-2 system allows for the transmission of intercepted information via steam heating pipes and other metal structures [15].
In 1987, at the request of the residents, an American technician installed a television antenna for collective use in a residential building housing Soviet diplomats in Washington. As a result of this «work», not only normal reception was ensured, but also eavesdropping on conversations in all apartments where televisions were located.

B. Using a 220-volt network

A very popular means of collecting information are systems installed in electrical outlets, switches, etc., transmitting conversations via 220 V wires. This method is very convenient for turning on and off a transmitter that has an unlimited power source, but in this case the issue of placing listening posts is complicated, since the signals transmitted via electrical wires do not pass through power transformers. The frequency range of the signals used is from 50 kHz to 300 kHz. At lower values, low-frequency network interference will have a strong effect, and at higher values, attenuation in the wires increases sharply, and electromagnetic radiation begins to increase, which negates all the advantages of secrecy.The operation of installing such equipment is quite complex. For example, CIA specialists spent more than two months organizing wiretapping of power supply networks. First, an agent was introduced into the organization of interest as a night watchman. After working for some time, he identified the premises where confidential events were taking place and photographed the sockets there on color film. At the request of the residency, plug sockets with equipment built into them were manufactured, and all the special signs of analogues (cracks, scratches, etc.) were applied to their surface. However, when the agent took up duty, he discovered that the color of the new sockets did not quite match the color of those that were supposed to be replaced. The sockets were delivered back to the residency, and here a specialist from the operational equipment department corrected the difference in shade. The agent again took up duty and replaced the sockets. At the same time, it was possible to rent an apartment behind the house where the premises of interest were located. The apartment was located before the transformers, and the information could be recorded. At the end of the operation, the equipment was dismantled.

G. Information transmission via telephone lines

In the last decade, acoustic listening systems for premises via a telephone line have become widespread abroad. Let us consider the algorithm of operation of such systems using the example of TELE-MONITOR [16]. Special sensors are installed on the telephone line (inside the telephone set) (connected in parallel). If it is necessary to listen to a conversation, a call is made from any telephone, including long-distance calls, and a special signal is sent to the telephone receiver. In this case, calls do not go through to the telephone and the TELE-MONITOR sensor begins to transmit conversations taking place in the room to the line. Up to four such sensors can be installed, say, to monitor four rooms of an apartment, and they can be initiated in any sequence.
There are no analogues on our market yet, but simplified systems are widely offered, the operational use of which is possible, but in strictly limited cases. Nevertheless, according to the data available at the «Special Equipment Laboratory», up to 50 such devices are sold per month. Their main drawback is that either the call goes to the phone, or two calls must be made. Experts claim that in six months to a year a system without these drawbacks will go on sale.
Today, the price for such equipment ranges from $ 15 to $ 450.

D. Radiotelephones

Radio telephones or radio bugs occupy a leading place among the used means of technical espionage. The simplest device contains three main units that determine the technical capabilities and methods of their use: a microphone that determines the acoustic sensitivity zone, a radio transmitter that determines its range, and a power source that determines the duration of its continuous operation. The range and quality are also affected by the characteristics of the receivers.

There are thousands of types of radio microphones in the world, including more than a hundred types developed in Russia literally in the last three or four years. The following generalized data on domestic and imported bugs offered on the market today can be given:

• range:, 30-1300 MHz
• power:, 0, 2-500 mW
• Current consumption: 0.5-100 mA
• Range of action: 10-1500 m (without repeater)
• Period of active existence: 4 hours-20 years.

As a rule, all systems use wideband FM and only some use narrowband. Most of the offered inexpensive products do not have quartz stabilization, in some cases it is not necessary. Dimensions range from several millimeters to tens of centimeters. Characteristics of common imported radio microphones are given in Table 2.

A wide variety of devices are used for reception: from household tape recorders to highly professional, including imported devices. Perhaps the main characteristic of the «bug-receiver» system is the sensitivity of the receiver. The better this parameter, the further the distance at which this system can be used.
Let's consider three types of receivers used. The first type includes ordinary household receivers and tape recorders. The advantage of tape recorders is the ability to record information transmitted over the radio channel. The advantages of such systems include their low cost and dual purpose. In addition, they usually do not arouse suspicion. The disadvantages include: low sensitivity, which limits the range of use; use of a public radio range (for domestic receivers 62-74 MHz, for imported ones — 88-108 MHz).

These shortcomings are partially eliminated in receivers of the second type. Usually, they «raise» the operating frequency range to 130 MHz in standard household radios and try to improve the sensitivity somewhat. This is usually achieved by rebuilding the circuits or using converters. In the latter case, the frequency range can be chosen to be almost any.
But these are all half measures. Professionals use specially developed equipment. As an example, consider the LST-P-3 receiver. Its sensitivity is about 1 <$Emu>V, range — 110-160 MHz [15]. All controls are implemented on buttons. The technical characteristics of some Western special receivers are given in Table 3.

As an example of the most common bug in the world and the CIS, let's consider the LST-1. The radio microphone provides transmission at a fixed frequency in the range of 106-170 MHz. The built-in microphone provides a radius of high-quality speech reception of up to 12 meters. Dimensions 34x16x12 mm. The range of information transmission is up to 150 m. Continuous operation time is at least 50 hours. In cases where a longer range is required, it is advisable to use the LST-2 (up to 1000 m, but with larger dimensions and shorter operating time) [15].

When talking about radio bugs, we cannot ignore the SIPE PS [7] type systems. This is a kit consisting of a silent pistol with a sighting range of 25 m and a «radio bug-arrow». It is designed to install a bug in places where physical access is impossible. The arrow with a miniature radio bug in a shockproof design is securely attached to surfaces made of any material — metal, wood, plastic, stone, concrete, etc. The microphone provides voice information within a radius of up to 10 m, and the transmitter — its transmission at a distance of up to 100 m. The tactics of use are as follows: the «arrow» is fired through an open window and attached to the wall. In real city conditions, the range does not exceed 50 m and this circumstance sharply reduces the operational value of the system in a number of cases.

As a rule, the limiting factor is power supply. Due to the short life of batteries, the agent must periodically penetrate the object, which is associated with risk. Sometimes it is possible to get out of the situation quite simply, as Soviet intelligence did when conducting an operation against the embassy of a Western country in a neutral country. Radio microphones were hidden in flower pots in the ambassador's office. The embassy guard, who had a penchant for alcoholic beverages, readily agreed to fulfill the request for a small reward. He was not interested in the people who took the pots from him from time to time and what they did with them [2], and the people changed their power supply. In turn, the Americans, conducting an operation against the Soviet embassy in Mexico, installed radio microphones in boxes for soft drinks [12].

To increase the operating time, they try to increase the capacity of the batteries, but this path has its limits. They try to increase the operating time by installing larger power sources, if possible. Thus, employees of the «Laboratory for Counteracting Industrial Espionage» during an inspection in one of the offices discovered a radio bug installed in a model of a sailing ship. The model itself was filled with power elements for six months — a year of continuous operation. The rigging of the model was used as an antenna.

Since about the mid-1970s, the use of radio bugs with built-in power supply by Soviet special services against foreign missions began to decline sharply [17]. The same trends are observed in industrial espionage. Designers of special equipment have taken the path of powering radio bugs from external sources.

One of the directions was the use of the camouflage's own power supply, i.e. products in which the radio microphone is disguised. An example is the installation of the LST-3 product in a calculator. Dimensions — 12x5x3 mm, microphone sensitivity — 10 m, transmission range in the range of 112-135 MHz — 150 m. The calculator battery is used as a power source. By the way, the «Laboratory of Special Equipment» if necessary, supplies the LST-3 complete with a flat (no thicker than 1.5 mm) and flexible lithium battery, which allows the product to be sewn into clothing, placed in the spine of books, etc.Another direction is the use of a 220V network. An example is the LST-4, which is installed in electrical outlets, table lamps and other electrical appliances, due to which it has a virtually unlimited time of use. A classic example of Western technical thought is the HR560 LIGHT WULD product [17]. This is a transmitter built into the base of an ordinary incandescent light bulb with a transmission range of up to 250 m. You can power the radio microphone with the voltage of a telephone line, as is done in the LST-3T5 [17].

The third direction is the use of solar batteries. So far, such devices have not become widespread due to a number of their inherent shortcomings, namely the inability to work in low light conditions. Perhaps only a product of the SIPE MT type is worthy of description. This is a solar-powered FM transmitter, made in the form of a whiskey glass. The solar battery elements are located at the bottom of the glass in the form of an original ornament. To increase stealth, the transmitter has two modes: it is on if the glass is on the table, and turns off if it is lifted and changed in space. The transmitter's range in the 130-150 MHz range is 100 m [7].

In addition, using remote activation allows you to save power and increase stealth. Such is the TRM-1530 product. This is a radio bug with a built-in microphone and powered by 3 lithium batteries. It operates in the range of 100-150 MHz, dimensions are 87x54x20 mm, the continuous operation time is at least 900 hours, and taking into account periodic shutdowns, at least 3600 hours. The range is 150 m. Domestic manufacturers have not yet presented anything similar (in similar dimensions) to the market, although the same Laboratory of Special Equipment has some good developments. Apparently, such equipment will go on sale in the near future.

An interesting direction is the use of repeaters. Such a system consists of two parts: a radio bug, the dimensions of which are minimal, and a repeater, the dimensions and power supply of which are practically unlimited. The essence of the matter is as follows. The range of a radio microphone does not exceed 10-100 m, due to which the current consumption is reduced and, consequently, the operating time increases. The repeater is installed in an adjacent room, car, etc. Powered by stationary sources, it ensures the transmission of intercepted information to the required range. The advent of isotope batteries has made it possible to dramatically increase the continuous operation time of radio bugs. Thus, the LST-2-RB powered by an isotope element in the dimensions of a «crown» can work for at least 10 years. Such devices are not sold to non-governmental agencies and individuals, however, in our country everything is possible. Such radio microphones were found in marble tiles of the external cladding of buildings, as well as in bricks of the internal masonry of buildings. In conclusion, it should be noted that it is quite difficult to find such products of the Russian special services. Thus, in the new building of the American embassy, ​​the elements of radio bugs were «scattered» across concrete blocks, representing flint inclusions, reinforcement was used as conductors, and voids — as resonators and antennas [17]. Fortunately, such products are currently only affordable for the special services, and businessmen do not need to be afraid of them. For now…

In conclusion, we will describe the smallest and most expensive radio microphone in the world, the dimensions of which do not exceed a quarter of a pencil eraser. This miniature transmitter is powered by an isotope element and costs about $ 40 thousand. It is capable of receiving and transmitting to a receiving device located one and a half kilometers away, a conversation that is conducted in a room in a whisper, for a year. In addition, «bugs» are already being produced that can record intercepted information, store it for a day or a week, transmit it in high-speed mode in a millisecond, erase the recording and start the process again. But for us this is still a prospect, albeit a near one.

E. IR transmitters

In recent years, to increase stealth, an infrared channel has been used to transmit information intercepted by a microphone. Low-power semiconductor lasers and LEDs are used as transmitters. Let's consider the TRM-1830 bookmark as an example. Its range during the day is 150 m, at night — 400 m. Current consumption is 8 mA, continuous operation time is 20 hours. Dimensions do not exceed 26x22x20 mm. Disadvantages include the need for direct visibility between the bookmark and the receiver and the influence of background illumination. All this sharply limits the operational capabilities of such devices. The most high-profile case in the United States related to the use of optical bookmarks is Watergate.

Directional microphones.

Ordinary microphones of the dynamic or electret type are capable of recording a human voice at normal volume at a distance of up to 15 meters, and at night, in calm weather, — 200 m. For intelligence purposes, this is not enough, since in some cases a range of approximately ten times greater is required [18, 19].

There are several modifications of directional microphones that perceive and amplify sounds coming from only one direction and attenuate all other sounds. In the simplest of them, a narrow directional pattern is formed by using a long tube. More complex designs can use several tubes of different lengths. High parameters are also found in narrowly directional microphones, in which the directional pattern is created by a parabolic sound concentrator[7].

Initially, such devices were used mainly by intelligence and security agencies, but later they entered the market and are widely used not only for espionage, but also for scientific and other purposes.

In Russia, the most common directional microphones are tubular. An example is the LST-NM-101 [15]. This is a directional microphone that allows listening through headphones and recording a conversation on a tape recorder at distances of up to 60 m. Of the Western systems of this type, tubular microphones camouflaged as an umbrella «in the English style» are widely represented. It has a built-in amplifier and a headphone output. The actual range is no more than 30 m. Theoretically, it is possible to create a microphone with a gain of more than 20 dB at an angle of less than 30 [20]. The characteristics of existing systems do not exceed 10 dB and 90, respectively.

A directional organ-type microphone is a bundle of several dozen thin tubes with lengths from several centimeters to a meter or more. Sound waves arriving at the receiver along the axis pass into the tubes and enter the precapsular volume in the same phase, and their amplitudes are added arithmetically, while sound waves arriving at an angle to the axis are phase-shifted, since the tubes have different lengths [20]. To date, such devices are not available on the market, with the exception of a few unsuccessful products.

An example of a directional microphone with a parabolic reflector is the LEA 6600 (aka «Big Ear», aka SIPE A-2) [6]. The range in open space is up to 1 km. The microphone is located at the focus of the reflector, its gain in the axial direction at a frequency of 1 kHz is about 25 dB. There is an amplification unit with AGC and an output for headphones and a tape recorder.

What I would like to note. As practice has shown, you should never trust advertising figures on the range. In real urban conditions, it is impossible to collect information from distances exceeding 100 m. Hundreds of meters can be achieved in exceptional cases such as: a nature reserve, early morning, fog, over a lake.

The operational use of directional microphones is such that an untrained person will not be able to use them covertly, since it is necessary to position oneself correctly relative to the reconnaissance object and sources of acoustic interference (noise) and at the same time not be detected. The latter is practically impossible in the case of using directional microphones with parabolic reflectors due to their overall dimensions. Therefore, such systems are rarely used to collect information. They are used mainly by journalists, as we could see when looking at the work of CNN employees during the October events in Moscow in 1993.
Unfortunately, there is an incompetent opinion that it is possible to «read» speech information from the windows of offices and cars using directional microphones. In fact, it is possible to intercept a conversation only if the window or vent is open (the window in the car is lowered).

Semi-active acoustic reconnaissance system

The most original, simplest and unnoticeable to this day is considered to be a semi-active radio microphone operating at a frequency of 330 MHz, developed in the mid-40s [18, 19]. It is interesting because it has no power source, no transmitter, and no microphone itself. Its basis is a cylindrical volumetric resonator, on the bottom of which a small layer of oil is poured. In the upper part of the cylinder there is an opening through which the internal volume of the resonator communicates with the air of the room in which the negotiations are being conducted. The upper part is made of plastic and is radio-transparent for radio waves, but an obstacle to acoustic vibrations. A metal bushing equipped with a quarter-wave vibrator tuned to a frequency of 330 MHz is inserted into the specified opening. The dimensions of the resonator and the level of liquid in it are selected in such a way that the entire system resonates to external radiation at a frequency of 330 MHz. In this case, the internal quarter-wave vibrator inside the resonator creates an external re-radiation field. When talking near the resonator, micro-oscillations appear on the surface of the oil, causing a change in the quality factor and resonant frequency of the resonator. These changes are sufficient to influence the re-radiation field created by the internal vibrator, which becomes modulated in amplitude and phase by acoustic oscillations. Such a radio microphone can only work when it is irradiated by a powerful source at the frequency of the resonator, i.e. 330 MHz. The main advantage of such a radio microphone is the impossibility of detecting it in the absence of external irradiation by known means of searching for radio bugs.

The first information about the use of such a semi-active system was made public by the American representative to the UN in 1952 [19]. This resonator was found in the coat of arms of the US Embassy in Moscow. Since then, ever higher ranges have been used for semi-active systems, up to millimeter waves; modern resonators are shaped like a plastic spoon [12]. The Americans complained that in the 1960s, their missions in the USSR were constantly irradiated with high-frequency signals in order to activate the built-in resonators [17].

By the way, using such systems is quite harmful to health, both for those being eavesdropped on and for those eavesdropping. CIA specialists were forced to wear special aprons to protect vital organs from the effects of harmful radiation when irradiating Soviet institutions.

The use of semi-active systems in industrial espionage is a rare occurrence in the West. Such systems are not yet available on the Russian market and will probably not be available for several years. However, with further improvements in countering technical intelligence equipment, life will force spies to insistently demand that manufacturers of special equipment produce semi-active systems.

In conclusion, we will give an example of a modern SIPE MM1 system [7]. The passive radio bug is made in the form of a rod about 30 cm long and 2.5 cm in diameter. The range is 100 m. It is supplied in a set consisting of a bug, a radiation source powered by the mains, and a receiving device.

3. 1. 2. Vibration channel

When an acoustic signal (speech) is applied to the surface of solid bodies, vibrations occur in them, and by recording them, you can listen to the conversations of interest. A vibration sensor is used as a sensor, converting vibration signals into electrical ones.

Stethoscope

All «pros» are very fond of a stethoscope, which freed them from tedious drilling. What it is, can be shown by the example of a product from DTI [21]. It consists of a vibration sensor with mastic applied to it for attaching to the wall, an amplification unit with a volume control and headphones. The size of the sensor is 2.2-0.8 cm, the range of received frequencies is 300-3000 Hz, the weight is 126 g, the gain is 20000. With the help of such means it is possible to listen through walls up to 1 m thick. In addition to the properties of the vibration sensor, the quality of the noise is affected by the thickness and material of the walls, the level of noise and vibration in both rooms, the correct location of the sensor, etc.

However, since it is not always possible to be in the adjacent room all the time, the vibration sensor is equipped with wired, radio and other information transmission channels, which are similar to those used with microphones. The advantage of vibration sensors is that they can be installed not in the room itself, which is often carefully guarded, but in neighboring ones, to which security services pay much less attention. As an example, we will cite two devices from SIPE [7].

The SIPE RS radio bug consists of a connecting cable and a radio transmitter. The stethoscope microphone with a diameter of 20 mm and a height of 34 mm ensures the collection of information through reinforced concrete structures up to 50 cm thick, doors and window frames with double glazing. It is installed on reinforced concrete using a magnet. The transmitter power is 20 mW, the range is 250 m. The transmitter size is 44x32x14 mm, weight is 41 g, the continuous operation time from the built-in power supply (EMF 2.6 V) is 90 hours.

Infrared eavesdropping system SIPE OPTO 2000. Consists of a miniature bug (IR transmitter) with linear dimensions of approximately 20×30 mm with a built-in microphone-stethoscope and a sensitive IR receiver, which includes a mirror lens with a focal length of 500 mm, a telescopic sight and an amplifier. The transmitter's range is 500 m. Its radiation is characterized by a wide directional pattern, which allows receiving signals from any convenient place.
Stethoscopes are in high demand on the Russian market, which, according to experts from the Special Equipment Laboratory, will continue to grow. As for more complex systems, they are used very rarely today. However, in the near future, radio microphones-stethoscopes will definitely find the widest application.

Laser microphones

The most promising direction is the use of laser microphones, the first samples of which were adopted by the American special services back in the 60s. As an example, let's consider the laser device HPO150 from Hewlett Packard [14], which provides effective detection, eavesdropping and recording of conversations taking place indoors. The range of the device is 1000 m. It is designed on a helium-neon or semiconductor laser with a wavelength of 0.63 μm (which, by the way, is a big disadvantage, since the spot is visible to the eye, more modern systems operate in the near IR range). Wiretapping and interception of conversations is carried out by receiving a reflected signal from ordinary window glass, which is a kind of membrane that vibrates at an audio frequency, creating a phonogram of the ongoing conversation.

The receiver and transmitter are made separately. A cassette magnetic recording device and a special interference compensation unit, as well as tripods, are supplied with the device. All equipment is housed in a small suitcase. Power supply is from a battery.

Working with such a system requires a lot of experience. In particular, it is necessary to choose the right pickup point, correctly position the equipment on the ground, and perform careful adjustment. In most cases, professional computer-based speech signal processing equipment is required to process intercepted messages. In short, such equipment is not for amateurs. It is known from the press that laser microphones were used against employees of the Soviet embassy and consulates in the United States. Conversations in the families of their employees were also eavesdropped at their place of residence. It can be assumed that Western intelligence agencies are capable of covertly using such devices inside Russia as part of their competitive struggle.

Similar systems have been imported to our country several times, but most of them have never been sold due to their high cost (from $10,000 to $130,000) and the lack of preparation of potential users (some could hear nothing but the cries of crows). Experiments have also been conducted in our country. Thus, a system with a range of 1,875 m [22] was created, but it can only be transported in a truck. There is an experimental system LST-LA2, with a range of about 60 m [25], at a fairly modest cost.

3. 1. 3. Hydroacoustic sensors

Acoustic vibrations, exciting vibrations in water supply and heating pipes, cause hydroacoustic signals in the liquid located in them. Theoretically, it is possible to intercept the discussed information within the building using a hydroacoustic sensor, and according to available data, such systems have been tested. However, it is obvious that the sensor will pick up conversations in all rooms, and, in addition, the noise level is too high, especially in the water supply. As a result, there is only one way: to install a transmitter in the hydroacoustic range in the heating battery. However, in this case, it is necessary to penetrate the object (say, under the guise of a plumber, and for reliability it is necessary to first turn off the water in the building), which makes the system less attractive. There is no need to be afraid of such means yet, since so far only the special services have «grown up» to using them.

3. 1. 4. Electroacoustic transformations

During a conversation, acoustic waves affect the structural elements of electronic devices. They, in turn, affect the electromagnetic field of the radiating elements or create microscopic currents in the conductors. All these currents and fields are modulated by speech and, with appropriate processing, useful information can be extracted.

This can be illustrated by the example of a telephone with an electromechanical bell. Acoustic waves act on the bell pendulum, connected to the anchor of an electromagnetic relay. Under the influence of speech signals, the anchor performs micro-oscillations, which, in turn, causes the anchor plates to oscillate in the electromagnetic field of the coils, resulting in the appearance of micro-currents modulated by speech.
Similar transformations occur in most electronic devices (electric clocks, televisions, radios, etc.). The range of interception of such signals is usually small, but sometimes exceeds 100 m. To enhance the effect, so-called high-frequency imposition is sometimes used. In this case, the electronic device is irradiated from the outside with a powerful high-frequency signal, and the reflected radiation modulated by speech is received. It must be said that all this is the prerogative of special services; amateurs are not yet up to such actions.

3. 1. 5. Visually

The ability of deaf-mute people to understand speech by lip movements has been known since ancient times. This is quite widely used for remote interception of conversations. Usually, due to the fairly large distance to the speaker, binoculars, telescopes, etc. are used. There are known cases when diplomats talking in the garden of the Soviet embassy in Mexico were filmed in order to decipher the conversation by lip movements. It should be noted that this method often does not bring the expected results and is practically not used in industrial espionage.

3. 2. TECHNICAL MEANS OF INTELLIGENCE: Interception of a telephone conversation

According to F. Jones, a specialist in technical communication channels in New York, in American practice the telephone is used to collect commercial information from competitors in seventeen cases out of a hundred [23].

3. 2. 1. Connecting to the line

The same means can be used to intercept telephone conversations as for listening to regular conversations (see Section 3.1), but the equipment must be installed at both subscribers. It is much easier to intercept by connecting to the line. This can be done either by direct physical contact with the line or by using an inductive sensor, i.e., not requiring cutting into the line. In practice, both methods are used, depending on the type of equipment used.

Stationary wiretapping

The most convenient way to organize wiretapping of telephone conversations is to use a stationary method, which is quite easy to do at a telephone exchange (switchboard). As an example, we will describe a wiretapping operation conducted by an American residency together with the Montevideo police department [12]. The necessary connections to the telephone lines at the substations are made by telephone company engineers at the request of the police department. A sixty-wire cable is stretched from the central telephone exchange in the business part of the city to the police department, where the wiretapping point is located on the top floor. The actuators and recording equipment are located there. The post is serviced by two technicians who transmit the recordings to the analytical point.

Our system is set up in a similar way. Until the mid-eighties, telephone conversations in the USSR were monitored only by special services and law enforcement agencies. As former KGB chief Vadim Bakatin claimed, before the August 1991 coup, the 12th Department of the KGB of the USSR wiretapped 300 subscribers in Moscow, mainly foreign citizens and criminals. Monitoring of official conversations was also carried out at high-security facilities, but here they were not monitoring a specific person, but rather the leakage of classified information. In this case, special systems were used that worked on key words and made it possible to interrupt (block) either a telephone conversation or individual phrases. In this case, the numbers of subscribers violating the regime were easily identified. However, the equipment for such monitoring was very expensive — about 200 thousand rubles (in 1980s prices) and was used mainly at large defense industry facilities and in government agencies [23].

According to the «Joint Decision on Operational and Technical Requirements for Telecommunications Facilities and Networks to Support Investigative Operations», published in [24], hardware and software are being introduced into the telecommunications networks to enable monitoring from a remote control point; provision must be made for the ability, upon commands from the control point, to change the category and composition of services provided to individual subscribers for a certain period; provision must be made for the ability, upon commands from the control point, to covertly connect channels and lines allocated to the security service to any subscriber lines (channels), including those in the state of an established connection.

Unfortunately, recently there have been several cases where telephone station technicians have been used by the mafia to eavesdrop on conversations. It should be recalled that, according to some sources, billionaire Onassis began accumulating his fortune while working as a night telephone operator.

Tube

The most common method of eavesdropping on conversations is using an existing parallel telephone. There are some types of devices where you don't even have to physically pick up the receiver, since due to some features the conversation can be heard quite well (RN-299).

If there is no parallel telephone, it is enough to simply install one. According to the employees of the «Laboratory for Counteracting Industrial Espionage», in most organizations the telephone network is so tangled and careless that there is no need to lay additional wires, there are always unused ones. In addition, there is no problem connecting on the stairs in the distribution box.

For one-time operations, you can use a simple tube, connecting it to the line through a penny resistor. It is even simpler to use an inductive sensor and headphones. In this case, it is enough to simply attach it to the desired line.

Dictaphone

Very often, voice recorders are used to record telephone conversations, secretly connected to the line. Special boxes (transformers) are used for connection. If the voice recorder has an acoustomat, then this is an ideal device for recording. In Russia, such products are used quite widely, due to their ease of use and low price (together with the voice recorder, no more than $ 200).

Often, a built-in tape recorder is used to record a telephone conversation, without the owner's knowledge. However, this is only possible if an agent has infiltrated the company.

In most cases, the connection is made before the distribution boxes, or in the distribution boxes themselves. Underground cable lines are still «too tough» for our domestic spies.

In contrast, the secret services are armed with equipment that allows them to listen in on conversations conducted over underground communication lines. Let us consider the principle of its operation using the American «Mole» system [25] as an example. Using a special inductive sensor that surrounds the cable, information transmitted over it is recorded. To install the sensor on the cable, wells through which the cable passes are used. The sensor in the well is attached to the cable and, to make detection more difficult, is pushed into the pipe that leads the cable to the well. Using the sensor attached to the cable, a high-frequency signal carrying information about the conversations conducted over the cable is recorded on the magnetic disk of a special tape recorder. Once full, the disk is replaced with a new one. The recording from the disk is transmitted to demodulation and listening devices installed in the premises of the secret services in embassy buildings. In order to simplify the task of finding the «Mole» device for replacing the disk, it is equipped with a signal radio station. An agent, driving or passing in the area where the spy device is installed, queries it with his portable radio transmitter to see if everything is OK. If no one has touched it, it transmits a corresponding signal. In this case, under favorable conditions, the agent replaces the disk in the tape recorder and the device continues to operate. The device can record information transmitted simultaneously over 60 telephone channels. The duration of continuous recording of a conversation on a tape recorder is 115 hours. Such devices have been found in Moscow.

More than ten similar «Moles» were removed by our specialists in Syria at the request of the Syrian side. There, all the listening devices were camouflaged as local objects and mined to make them impossible to remove. Some of them exploded when they were attempted to be removed. Different listening devices have been developed for different types of underground cables: for symmetrical high-frequency cables — devices with inductive sensors, for coaxial and low-frequency cables — with direct connection systems and the removal of a small portion of the energy for interception purposes. For cables in which increased air pressure was maintained, devices are used that prevent it from decreasing, as a result of which a special alarm is prevented. Some devices are equipped with radio stations for direct transmission of intercepted conversations to the center for their processing, but this is the topic of the next section.

Telephone radio transmitter

Telephone bugs can be connected to any point on a telephone line and have an unlimited service life, as they are powered by the telephone network. These products are extremely popular in the industrial espionage environment due to their simplicity and low cost (from $15 to $200).

Most telephone bugs are special radio bugs. They are automatically turned on when the telephone receiver is picked up and transmit the telephone conversation via radio to the interception point, where it can be listened to and recorded. Since the telephone has its own microphone and the bugs do not need a power source, their dimensions can be miniature.

The most common type of product in Russia is the LST-5. With dimensions of 22x14x13 mm, it emits at a fixed frequency in the range of 60-170 MHz at a distance of up to 400 m, and when an antenna is connected, up to 1000 m. The frequency can be changed independently within 10 MHz [15].

More advanced, although with a significantly shorter range, bugs are produced in the form of capacitors that are installed in the telephone itself or in the socket (LST-5K). Combined systems are also produced that provide wiretapping of both telephones and premises (LST-5-1). An interesting product is offered by the SIPE company. The TK CRISTAL product is made in the form of a telephone microphone and can be installed in it in a few seconds. The transmitter frequency is stabilized by quartz. The range is 150 m.

3.2.2. Side electromagnetic signals and interference

Any electronic product emits so-called side electromagnetic radiation and interference during operation. Very common are phones with push-button dialers such as TA-T, TA-12, etc. When dialing a number and conducting negotiations, due to the technical features of the power supply, all information is retransmitted on dozens of frequencies in the MW, HF and VHF ranges at a distance of up to 200 m. In the case of using such a phone, radio bugs are not needed. But this is simply an outrageous case. Usually, interception is carried out in a more complex way. With the help of a small-sized inductive sensor, it is possible to detect side electromagnetic oscillations of the autotransformer of almost any telephone set at a distance of up to half a meter. In this case, the dialed numbers and all conversations are also recorded.

3.3. TECHNICAL MEANS OF INTELLIGENCE: Interception of conversations on a radiotelephone

Recently, radio telephones and radio stations of various types have become very popular among businessmen. Most of them are imported, but domestic models are also appearing. Oddly enough, some believe that they can be eavesdropped on using a regular telephone, but in the case of a radio telephone this is practically impossible. We will have to dispel these illusions, but first it is necessary to describe the operating principle of various radio telephones. A radio telephone is a set of two radio stations, one of which is the base station, installed stationary and connected to the telephone network, the second is mobile. It differs from a regular radio station in that the user of a radio telephone goes directly to the city telephone network [26]. Therefore, wiretapping of telephone conversations can be carried out using the same methods described in Section 3. 2. In addition, it is possible to wiretap a conversation using the methods described in Section 1, provided that the user's office or car is under «coverage».

If there is cellular communication in the region, you can become its subscriber, and the quality of communication (interference immunity) will be significantly better. But you can use the same wiretapping methods.

The range of a radiotelephone depends on the frequency range in which it operates, the output power and the antenna used. In the VHF range, the range of radio communication is also affected by the terrain and the presence of various buildings. The range of «wireless» phones rarely exceeds 300 m. Other radiotelephones operate at ranges from 1 to 100 km.

In terms of information collection, radio telephones, including cellular systems, and radio stations have in common the fact that they use radio waves in their work. There is no need to install radio microphones, telephone bugs, use laser microphones or stethoscopes, it is enough to purchase a high-quality receiver, install a good antenna and quietly listen to conversations. In this case, the range of radio interception will be no less than the range of a radio telephone, and with good equipment — several times more. In addition, the emitted signals can be used to determine the location of a car equipped with a radio telephone.

Thus, the German company «Schmidt und Folke», which competed with other companies in the development of deposits on the seabed, had its most valuable secret stolen: the exact geographic location of the surveyed area. Agents listened in on the radio communications of the company's floating terminal station with its computer center on land and then processed the information received. They sold the results of their work to a competing company, which thanks to this saved a significant amount, since exploration of mineral deposits at great depths is always associated with high costs.

The most advanced portable universal reconnaissance receiver is the Miniport by Rohde & Schwarz with a frequency range of 20-1000 MHz. It can be used to easily intercept all radio stations and radio telephones without exception. The receiver described has small dimensions, universal power supply (from a battery and from the network) and can be successfully used in stationary field conditions. The receiver is controlled digitally through a built-in processor. Visual reading of the frequency value is made from a digital display with a step of 1 kHz. The microprocessor memory can remember up to 30 frequency values, can scan with a variable step. The capabilities of the receiver can be expanded by combining it with a compact spectrum analyzer, specially designed for it — type EPZ100. For ease of use of the equipment complex in field conditions, special auxiliary cases are manufactured, where the battery, receiver with spectrum analyzer and set of antennas are separately placed[26, 28].

The reader should know from movies and TV films that the determination of the location (direction finding) of radio stations operating on radiation is carried out using directional antennas rotating in a horizontal plane. To determine the exact location of the source, it is necessary to have several, at least two direction finders, to make a «spot» at the intersection of two bearings of one source from different places. Recently, more advanced Doppler-type direction finders have appeared, which do not have mechanically rotating antennas, but have one antenna mast on which more than ten identical dipoles are located. Due to special signal processing, instantaneous direction finding of the emitter is performed.

When such an antenna is combined with the receiver described above, it is possible to detect a radio signal, measure its parameters and take a bearing in 0.1 s. Taking into account the need to transmit data to another direction-finding post in order to unambiguously determine the location of the radiation source, about 1-2 s are required to know the exact location [19]. Thus, without having time to say a few words on the radiotelephone, the subscriber accurately indicates the location of his car.

In a number of cases, special radio beacons are used, which are secretly installed in cars, and in some cases sewn into clothing, mounted in a briefcase, etc. to ensure control over the movement of the object of surveillance around the city. For example, such a device was planted by CIA employees on one of their former colleagues. The device allowed not only to determine the location of the object using a radio direction finder, but also to eavesdrop on conversations in the room [12].

The National Security Agency (NSA) is a US government agency with six times the number of employees of the CIA, engaged in electronic intelligence. From its bases, say, in Turkey, conversations on radio telephones in Moscow are tapped. High-speed computers are used to process the intercepted information. When they come across predetermined key words, meaning that the text is of interest to the NSA, a printed copy is made for further study. Participants in international projects may well become an object of interest to the NSA, which often acts in the interests of American corporations [29, 30].

Experts claim that interception can also be carried out during the transmission of ordinary long-distance telephone conversations (as well as telegraph, fax, etc.) via communications satellite or radio relay lines. This is the work of the same NSA, which accounts for a large share of American appropriations for intelligence needs. Every day it «processes» up to 40 tons of classified documentation.

As noted in the Western press, US spy satellites and ground-based radio intelligence posts are increasingly focused on eavesdropping on international commercial communications lines, as a result of which American radio intelligence is becoming a «witness» to many commercial transactions and is able to identify «bottlenecks» in the development of the economies of many countries, including Russia. For example, it is known that the NSA has received large dividends by intercepting communications from foreign gas and oil companies in the Middle East, financial trading organizations in Europe and Japan, and transmitting this information to American firms. All this is fully applicable to Russia. One can only hope that the aces of domestic radio interception will also begin to «share» with Russian companies directly intercepted information, which will lead to mutual benefit.

3.4. TECHNICAL MEANS OF INTELLIGENCE: Unauthorized receipt of a document on paper

Most documents are still executed on paper. This includes official correspondence, memos, meeting materials, and various kinds of notebooks. Experts say that getting your hands on the «diary» of an executive is a great success, since you can get a huge amount of information from it. Very often, the most important notes are made on separate sheets and flip calendars. In addition, all technological and accounting documentation is printed on paper. All this is also of interest to criminals.

In most organizations, documents are not accounted for and piles of papers migrate from office to office or are piled up anywhere, even in the corridors. In such an environment, the loss of any document will not cause much concern, and papers are lost, sent to the wrong addresses, and simply disappear without a trace.
Sometimes confidential papers are taken outside the organization, where they are much easier to steal. For example, the French deputy Paul Reynaud took a top secret document about the war in Indochina. He was called to the phone, and he left the papers in his briefcase for a short time unattended. As a result, the plans ended up in Hanoi [5].

In those organizations where document accounting is more or less organized, criminals have to use other approaches. Very often you can see idle «friends of a friend» in offices, who come with a request to send a fax, use e-mail, a photocopier, or just to chat. Moving from office to office, they can familiarize themselves with many documents lying on the tables and quickly make copies of them. The same tasks can be performed by bribed employees, as well as «electricians», «plumbers», etc. Specialists from the «PPSh Laboratory» have repeatedly demonstrated to company management how even very strict security freely let an «electrician» dressed in overalls through. Since any office has copying and duplicating equipment, the agent does not need to carry anything with him. In extreme cases, they take cameras for covert shooting.

Covert reconnaissance photography using small cameras was carried out as early as the end of the 19th century, but the equipment of that time was still bulky and unreliable [14]. A real small camera for covert photography appeared only in the mid-1930s under the name «Minox». They were widely used before, during and after World War II. Their simple and reliable design is the basis for modern cameras for covert photography [31, 32].

Modern cameras for covert photography have approximate dimensions of 71x56x32 mm, focal length F = 25 mm and a set of instant shutter speeds — 1/140-1/500 s and are capable of shooting all objects from a distance of 1.2 m and further without additional focusing. There are dozens of types of such cameras. The built-in flash lamp allows for instant shooting of various documents at close range in any lighting conditions indoors and outdoors. The energy of the built-in battery is sufficient for up to 200 flashes. The undoubted advantage of using such cameras is their low price, availability and, as a cover, their domestic purpose.

Security services are armed with cameras that can be hidden under a shirt with the lens output on a tie in the form of a pin [4]. Such systems have not yet been widely used in industrial espionage in Russia.

A very old but useful method of work is studying the contents of wastebaskets, although most have heard stories about how underground workers got jobs as cleaners in German commandant's offices, and how many partisan lives were saved by drafts of documents retrieved from wastebaskets.

If it is not possible to enter the office, binoculars are used, as well as cameras and movie cameras with long-focus lenses. Thus, a widely known incident occurred during the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975, when a photographer located in a neighboring building took a series of photographs of Henry Kissinger reading secret documents of the State Department. In the photographs taken with a long-focus lens, the documents turned out to be easily readable [7].

Special lenses that allow photographing through narrow openings such as a keyhole are very popular in the West.

Every spy's dream is to install a remote-controlled movie or photo camera in the right office. Such equipment is available. As a rule, it is a CCD camera no larger than a cigarette pack, equipped with a transmitter with a radio channel and, sometimes, an external lens with a fiber-optic line. Camouflage can be very diverse. Some hotel rooms where the right people are accommodated are equipped with such surveillance systems. Low-level lenses allow filming at night, which, according to the Americans, demoralizes surveillance personnel due to bed scenes.

And the last thing. We must not forget that many offices have an internal television system, usually intended for security. It is not difficult to connect to it and view what is happening in the premises together with the security, and if possible, read the documents.

3.6. TECHNICAL MEANS OF INTELLIGENCE: Interception of mail

In the 15th century, the men of the Tacco clan hired themselves out to deliver mail and dispatches from the Pope to his numerous foreign correspondents. In this difficult, risky and financially demanding job, the Taccos began to enjoy the trust of the Pope, and then the Spanish King and numerous German princes. The members of the clan were very clever, silent, and knew how to keep secrets and secretly trade them. They provided countless services to the great of this world: to those who passionately wanted to know what the Pope was concerned about in distant Spain and France, why couriers were frequenting a neighboring prince, what were the financial capabilities of the opposing side, and so on. Over time, the Tacco family became recognized spies who demanded monetary compensation for the risk and moral damage and received it in full from the warring parties [10]. The results of many years of work are as follows: today the Thurn und Taxis family owns breweries in Germany, its own companies and banks in Europe, and land on both sides of the Atlantic.

Reading other people's letters has always been a favorite pastime in all countries. For this purpose, improvised means and special equipment were used. CIA employees use hot plates, metal teapots and variously shaped bone instruments. However, the most effective method is to use a special device resembling a miniature table the size of an ordinary briefcase with a flat surface heated by hot steam, which is provided by a heating element enclosed in foam rubber. Steam is generated by damp blotting paper, which is placed on the heated surface of the table, and envelopes placed on this blotting paper open literally in a few seconds. The process is completed by carefully sealing the envelopes with cotton swabs and clear transparent glue [12].

Technological progress has come to the aid of those who like to read other people's letters. Now there is no need to acquire skills by hopelessly ruining dozens of clumsily opened envelopes. It is enough to simply buy a spray can containing special chemicals and spray the envelope with its contents. For some time the envelope will become transparent, and you can easily read the contents. Similar spray cans are also sold in Russia. The low price (about $20-170) and ease of use make them readily available.

3.7. TECHNICAL MEANS OF INTELLIGENCE: Unauthorized receipt of a document on a non-paper medium

Nowadays, more and more information is concentrated on non-paper media. These primarily include hard drives and diskettes of personal computers, punched tapes and punched cards of computers from the 60s and 70s that have survived here and there, microfilms and films, audio and video cassettes, and laser discs. Particular attention should be paid to personal computers (PCs), for the following objective reasons:

@BOS11 = high growth rates of the number of PCs in operation;
@BOS11 = widespread use of PCs in a wide variety of areas of human activity;
high degree of information concentration in PCs;
complication of the computing process in the PC [33].

The future is non-paper media. Just one company «Travellers» has 35,000 terminals and PCs, while 3.7 million messages are transmitted daily through a 600,000 km long coaxial and fiber-optic communication network. The net savings per year are 32 freight cars of paper [34].
However, the growth in the number of computers and the development of information networks have given rise to a number of problems. A new branch of industrial espionage has emerged, related to the extraction of information from data processing systems (DPS). Stanford Institute specialists, having conducted in-depth studies of DPS, concluded that the number of unauthorized penetrations into computers of US government agencies in 1984 was more than 450, and the total damage was over $200 million. At the same time, according to experts, 85% of cases of unauthorized penetration into DPS remain unsolved [35]. According to the magazine «Quick», one German «hacker» (computer intruder) used his PC to gain access to arrays containing information about the SDI program [36]. Private companies lose millions of dollars due to the leakage of confidential information. The magazine «Spiegel» panickedly stated that in the age of computers, «digital agents» have come to the forefront, belonging to the new elite of the criminal world and representing «a greater danger than railroad robbers, counterfeiters or safe-crackers, they can ruin an entire company with one blow or cause irreparable damage to some branch of industry, or even an entire country.»

Since huge amounts of information are stored on non-paper media, access to them is of the greatest interest. A potential target may be any information stored on media that can bring profit to the «hacker» or his employer. This information includes almost all information constituting a commercial secret of companies, from developments and «know-how» to payrolls, which make it easy to «calculate» the company's turnover, number of employees, etc. Information on bank transactions and loans, as well as stock exchange transactions, is especially valuable. Thus, one of the Russian news agencies created a unique database on a number of economic issues. After some time, it was stolen and began to be printed with good advertising in one of the republics of the former USSR. The success of the database was stunning and brought the thieves considerable profit. Our entrepreneur was left with a debt of 23 million rubles in mid-1992 prices [37].

Theft of information carriers

This is probably the most popular method in Russia. They steal everything: floppy disks and video cassettes, computers and laser discs (along with players). The whole trouble is that, most often, they steal all this not as a storage medium, but as an ordinary material value that can be sold. So the security services rack their brains over whether a stolen floppy disk with a list of consumers will become a trump card in a big competitive struggle, or a couple of computer games will be recorded on it.

Domestic «amateur spies» say that in the vast majority of companies and government organizations «stealing» a floppy disk is no problem, since they are piled high near any computer. True, the results rarely live up to expectations — the bulk of what is stolen is still the same toys. Stealing a hard drive is much more difficult, since it must be removed from the car, which requires a lot of time. It is easier to take the system unit right away and calmly walk past the security, having previously thrown a torn robe of an indeterminate color over your coat. All this, of course, is not a high class. But such things happen all the time.

Unauthorized copying

There is no need to steal anything, especially since you can be prosecuted for theft. It is much easier to copy everything interesting onto your diskettes and leave the office with the sense of having honestly fulfilled your duty. This method is usually used by recruited employees, or those same «acquaintances of an acquaintance» who asked to use a computer for a short time. Very often, employees themselves are not averse to selling information «to the side». Thus, the company «Encyclopedia Britannica» opened a criminal case against three operators of its computers, accusing them of copying the names of about 3 million of the most «valuable» customers and selling them to an outsider [36]. Sometimes companies themselves pass on information to outsiders, for example, by handing over a PC for repair with a hard drive filled to capacity with information.

There are those who like to dig through electronic «trash cans». The fact is that when a file is erased, it is not actually physically destroyed and can be easily restored using Norton utilities.

Unauthorized data reading

Sometimes there is no need to copy the entire file, it is enough to just look at a certain number or name. In this case, the necessary information is simply displayed on the screen, which does not take time, and at the same time you can always refer to an error in your actions.

Since many PCs require a password to log in, attackers try to find out in advance, and if this is impossible, they use the method of trying the most probable words (IBM, DOS, owner's name, company name, etc.). Very often, the password can be written down on a calendar, in a notepad, or even directly on the keyboard.

Unauthorized use of PCs of registered network users

If personal computers are connected to a network, then all the above operations are greatly simplified for registered users. «Hackers» very often resort to using the most physically accessible terminal to read information. Apparently, this direction is the most promising from the point of view of industrial espionage. If the network is accessed via a modem, then «penetrating» into the memory of any subscriber is quite simple. Thus, a young programmer Ward was arrested in California for systematically stealing information from the computer memory of an Oakland company. In order to steal information worth 25 thousand dollars, he only needed to pick a password. He was not caught for a year, and this is the saddest thing [13].

3.8. TECHNICAL MEANS OF INTELLIGENCE: Unauthorized interception of a non-paper document during its processing

When processing a non-paper document, some additional opportunities for unauthorized removal of information arise. The most important thing is that in most cases this does not require penetration of the facility.

Image on the display

When working with an electronic document, it is very often necessary to obtain its image (a computer display, a VCR TV, a slidescope screen, etc.). Accordingly, optical and optoelectronic means described above can be used to retrieve information, which is what actually happens if such an opportunity arises.

Side electromagnetic signals and interference

When electronic equipment is operating, side electromagnetic radiation and interference on wires, cables and other conductive communications (pipes, fittings, etc.) are generated. The most likely interception of information is when receiving radiation from displays, magnetic disk drives, printers and connecting cables.

The easiest way to retrieve information is from the display. The image on the screen is formed, basically, in the same way as in a television receiver. The video signal required to obtain the image modulates the current of the electron beam. Thus, it is a digital signal, the logical unit of which creates a light point, and the logical zero prevents its appearance. In addition, clock sync pulses are present in the display circuits.

The sources of video signal radiation can be elements of image signal processing and the electron beam of the kinescope. Unlike other signals existing in the PC, the video signal is amplified to several tens of kilovolts to be fed to the cathode-ray tube. Therefore, the video amplifier is the most powerful (and dangerous) source of broadband radiation. The source of narrowband radiation is the synchronization system.

The radiation of displays containing harmonics of video signals covers the range of meter and decimeter waves. At some frequencies (for example, 125 and 210 MHz — slightly above the fifth and tenth television channels, respectively) there are resonances that cause the radiation to increase relative to neighboring frequencies.

The information displayed on the display can be reconstructed using a household TV. By tuning to one of the «petals» of the energy spectrum of radiation, we obtain a copy of the display image consisting of white letters on a black (gray) background.

However, the display radiation received by the TV does not contain information about the synchronization signal, so the image on the TV screen moves in the horizontal and vertical directions.

Reception quality can be improved by using an external sync signal generator fed to the receiver. With such a $15,200 attachment, information can be restored to a regular TV set from any type of display (including an alarm system monitor, etc.) provided that its radiation level is high enough. The signals at the generator output should have frequencies of 15-20 kHz for line synchronization and 4-80 kHz for frame synchronization [38].

It will not be difficult for a non-specialist to obtain information in this way at a distance of up to 10 m (behind a wall). Using a special antenna and amplifier, a professional will successfully complete the task at a distance of up to 150 m. The interception of information from a display was first demonstrated at the International Congress on Computer Security held in Cannes in March 1985. An employee of the Dutch telecommunications company RTT literally shocked specialists by using a device he had developed to obtain data from a display screen installed on the eighth floor of a building located approximately 100 meters away from a car on the street [7].

The second most important channel of information leakage is quasi-stationary information magnetic and electric fields emitted by heads of floppy and hard magnetic disk drives, cables, circuit elements, etc. These fields rapidly decrease with distance, but cause interference on any conductive circuits (telephone wires, metal pipes, etc.). In this case, the radiation maxima are in the range from tens of kilohertz to tens of megahertz.

The easiest radiation to restore is that generated by magnetic disk drives [39]. As an example, we can refer to a device that can detect bank account numbers and access codes when inserting a credit card (magnetic) into a cash machine. In addition, it is not difficult to restore information induced through power circuits. At the same time, the protective network filters installed on many machines are not a reliable barrier.

So far, there have been no cases of interception of information via side channels of data hijacking for commercial purposes in Russia, although there are specialists and equipment. This is evidenced by complaints from Americans about information leaks via side electromagnetic channels and interference.

For example, a wire was found in the fireplace of the naval attaché at the US Embassy in Moscow, going through the chimney into the neighboring building. Due to the lack of connected microphones and other equipment, at first glance, its purpose was unclear, but over time it was established that radiation from operating information processing equipment was induced on it [17].
The Americans are not far behind.

For many years in Montevideo they rented a building next to the Soviet embassy. During this time, CIA technicians worked there, using special equipment, trying to intercept electromagnetic signals from encryption equipment. If such radiation is successfully captured, it is possible to decipher the dispatches [12].

Hardware bugs

Intercepting side electromagnetic radiation and interference is quite a troublesome business, and signal restoration is the domain of professionals. Such operations are expensive, and do not always give an effect (with the exception of intercepting radiation from displays).

In this regard, the desire to install special devices in computing equipment that, powered by its voltage sources, would transmit information for months at a fixed frequency over significant distances (up to 2 km) is clear. The most promising in this regard is the introduction of such devices into keyboards, magnetic disk drives, etc. NSA specialists have repeatedly found similar Soviet-made devices in computing equipment.

Thus, transmitter microcircuits were found in an encoder and in a printer power cable. All this allowed the CIA director to claim that Russia was ten years behind the United States in technical development in all electronics, except for technical espionage equipment [17]. It is possible that tomorrow such equipment will be used inside our country.

So far, in Russia, only enterprises working for «defense» should be wary. For example, radio signal beacons installed in packaging have been repeatedly discovered.

With the help of such devices, foreign intelligence services find out where exactly purchased equipment is being delivered.

A detailed examination of some PCs revealed that additional units are built into them. They are assembled from standard modules used in PCs and installed in such a way as to have access to output or input information into the machine.

Transmission to the listening post is carried out via a radio channel [25].

Software bookmarks

A promising direction is the introduction of software bookmarks. Their task can be to obtain information about passwords, code combinations, processed data and transmit this information to a specified address via the network, e-mail, etc.

For now, this is more of a hypothetical threat, but it can quickly become a reality, thanks to the ability to «deliver» such programs to the desired PC. In fact, the methods are the same as for computer viruses, and the bookmarks themselves are essentially viruses. Currently, the following main mechanisms of virus penetration are known [40].

Direct connection — transmission of viruses through the means of exchange used in the attacked system. The actual introduction is carried out through the least protected nodes of the system or by delivering «infected» software.

Indirect connection — these are methods of penetrating a system through subsystems that do not directly serve its main purpose (power supply, stabilization, etc.), not necessarily built on electrical connections with processors.

One ​​of the methods — introducing viruses by feeding calculated electromagnetic pulses into the power supply circuit. The Japanese and Americans are working especially hard on this issue.

3. 9. TECHNICAL MEANS OF INTELLIGENCE: Interception of a document on a non-paper medium during its transmission

Currently, a huge amount of information is transmitted via various communication channels, and, as a rule, the telephone network is used.

Such services as e-mail, telex, fax, teletext, videotext, transmission of stock exchange information, banking operations, etc. are increasingly being developed.

The main disadvantage of using telephone communication for data transmission is its availability to anyone with the appropriate equipment.

The methods used to intercept transmitted messages are basically the same as those used to eavesdrop on telephone conversations.

Let's consider this using the example of facsimile communication (fax), since many businessmen believe that this is the most secure form of communication.

In fact, transmitted texts can be intercepted by anyone using a device that costs several hundred dollars.

And the Japanese company «Nippon Telephone and Telegraph» reported that it has evidence of connections to its fax machines not only in Japan, but all over the world.

It is also common to send information to the wrong addresses.

The fact is that people often make mistakes when dialing a number, and if in the case of a regular telephone conversation they immediately understand that they are talking to the wrong person, then this does not happen when sending a message over a computer network or fax.

In addition, when sending information to the correct address, they often do not check who exactly received it, and this person may be an intruder.

3.10. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE MEANS: Obtaining unauthorized information about the production process

If it is impossible to obtain information in concentrated form through agents, chatterboxes, by eavesdropping on telephone conversations and «hacking» a computer data bank, the spy has to infiltrate production.

This is a huge layer of possibilities in terms of the variety of ways of obtaining information.

In fact, it is impossible to even briefly describe them in one small book.

To analyze the possibilities of obtaining information directly from production, it is necessary to study it thoroughly, find out the real channels of information leakage about the most important processes, develop an operation to identify them with the involvement of appropriate equipment. All this is a rather troublesome matter, requiring the involvement of operative workers-technologists, scientists of various fields, programmers, etc.

Thus, when developing a chemical plant, it is necessary to analyze emissions into the atmosphere (gas analyzers), waste water (special chemical reagents), intercept side electromagnetic signals and interference from process equipment, study incoming raw materials and production waste, etc.

All this is a huge painstaking work, the success of which is not guaranteed. In addition, industrial espionage can also include the analysis of finished products with the purpose of releasing their modified versions under one's own brand.

This is most common in the field of software development. «Hackers» break the protection of programs and use the extracted information at their own discretion.

Fortunately, all you need for this is a computer and a head.

Due to the complexity and diversity of work on obtaining information about the production of products, in Russia only foreign intelligence services can do this, and even they do so without much enthusiasm.

Only after our industrial giants and young small enterprises close the gaping holes in their security will the stage of «collecting sawdust and waste water» begin.

CONCLUSION

In such a small volume, it is impossible to even briefly describe all the possible methods of obtaining information.

The authors deliberately did not mention some of them because the time has not yet come and they do not want to create difficulties in the work of government agencies to protect citizens, i.e. all of us, from criminals and foreign spies.

In addition, I would not like this book to become a kind of training manual for beginning spies, although it was apparently not possible to completely avoid this.

For them, we repeat that the work of collecting information is not romantic, but a very dangerous business that requires special skills, cover groups, «legends», agents, big money and great intelligence.

We hope that businessmen, politicians, and just people who for various reasons have become bearers of commercial and other secrets, have gained an idea of ​​the real capabilities of criminals in Russia.

In the future, a more detailed work on special means and measures to counter them will probably be published.

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