Comparative analysis of tactical and technical requirements for military and police systems with unmanned aerial vehicles.

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Comparative analysis of tactical and technical requirements for military and police systems with unmanned aerial vehicles.

Comparative analysis of tactical and technical requirements for military and police systems with unmanned aerial vehicles.

Dmitry Alekseevich Mityushin,
Candidate of Technical Sciences
Moscow University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, Moscow

Comparative analysis of tactical and technical requirements for military
and police complexes with unmanned aerial vehicles

Source: magazine «Special Equipment» No. 2 2011

The article provides a comparative analysis of the tactical and technical requirements (TTR) imposed on complexes and systems with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) of the Armed Forces, and the TTR that can be imposed by the ordering structures of the internal affairs agencies (OVD) of the Russian Federation. Various types of target loads that can be placed on UAVs are briefly considered.

For the development and production of systems and complexes with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as well as any other military and special equipment, it is necessary to have a system of general technical requirements (SGTR) for this type of equipment. Currently, UAV systems are mostly used to solve problems facing the Armed Forces (AF), and the Air Force (AF) is the lead agency for all unmanned topics in the Russian Armed Forces, regardless of which branch of the Armed Forces or type of troops will use the UAV system being developed or planned for development. The main guiding documents for the development of UAV systems are the SGTR of the Air Force. At the same time, for example, to solve artillery reconnaissance problems, artillery aerial reconnaissance systems are being developed, for which a draft of the corresponding document OTT 7.1.28.1 has been developed as a SGTR with the participation of the author.

Despite some similarity of tasks to be solved in the interests of the Armed Forces and the police [2], there are still certain differences both in the conditions and tactics of use, and in the nature of the objects and subjects of use of this type of equipment. The differences are manifested primarily in the fact that the Armed Forces and the police operate in different legal fields. The Armed Forces conduct combat operations, first of all, in accordance with combat regulations and instructions for ensuring combat operations. Thus, the Combat Regulations of the Ground Forces [4] state that «the main form of tactical actions of units is combat, which is an organized and coordinated action of units, military units and formations for the purpose of destroying (defeating) the enemy.»

The police have never been faced with the task of destroying a criminal. The criminal must be detained and brought to trial. The internal affairs bodies (IAB) of Russia in their activities to prevent, suppress and solve crimes are guided by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws, orders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and other regulatory legal acts.

Based on this, the TTTs that can be presented to the complexes will differ from the requirements presented to them by the Armed Forces.

Let us consider these requirements in more detail [3]. Let us start with the requirements for the purpose.

First, let us define that the complexes (systems) with UAVs of the internal affairs agencies (Hereinafter referred to as «complexes») (police) should be understood as complexes with UAVs that are equipped (armed) by the internal affairs agencies (police) and solve the tasks facing them.

Depending on the method of using aerodynamic forces, UAVs can be either lighter than air or heavier. This article will mainly focus on heavier-than-air UAVs.

The technical appearance of the complex will vary within certain limits depending on the tasks being solved [2]. Despite the fact that most UAVs are ultra-light aircraft [1], ATS complexes can be divided into three classes:

  •  light — UAV takeoff weight up to 5 kg (UAV launch from hand);
  •  medium — UAV take-off weight from 5 to 30 kg (UAV launch from a catapult device, with the exception of vertical take-off and landing UAVs — VTOL);
  •  heavy — UAV take-off weight over 30 kg.

In this case, all types of complexes may be included in the composition of police aviation units (OVD), and only light and medium ones in the composition of non-aviation police units [2]. It is necessary to pay attention to the mandatory requirement of the absence of specialized runways for the operation of these complexes.

Composition of the complex

To solve the overwhelming majority of tasks, the complex must be manufactured in a mobile version.

The number of transport units of the ground part (GP) of the complex must not exceed 3 units (unit — unit (for example, equipment)(4-5 units — for heavy complexes). The basic chassis of the transport units can be any, both wheeled (preferably on a high-cross-country chassis, such as GAZ-2330 «Tiger», SPM-3, Hummer), and tracked (for hard-to-reach areas, such as MTLBu).

In general, the complex should include the following elements:

• ground equipment consisting of:
    — a ground control post (GCP);
    — a launcher or a transport and launch vehicle (PU or TPM) (only for medium and heavy complexes);
    — technical support vehicles (TSV) (only for medium and heavy complexes);
    — transport (TM) or transport and recovery vehicle (TEM — only for heavy complexes);

• a certain number of UAVs with different target loads (TL). The required number of UAVs can be transported by TPM, MTO, TM, TEM, as well as other vehicles, including those not included in the complex, depending on the nature of the tasks to be solved, the search area and a number of other factors.

Purpose of the components of the complex

In general, the NPU is designed to solve the following tasks:

  • ensuring interaction of the complex with the head of a special operation (SO) or operational-search measures (ORM), the relevant operational headquarters and/or other consumers of information during the execution of the task;
  • control of all elements of the complex on site and in motion;
  • exchange of service information with one or more UAVs in flight, control of the UAV flight, receipt of information from one or more UAVs;
  • reception of control commands, warning signals and orders via automated and non-automated communication channels while parked and in motion;
  • automated development of a flight plan and its coordination with the appropriate official, including, if necessary, with air traffic control authorities via automated and non-automated communication channels (If regulatory legal acts establish a different procedure for coordinating a flight plan, then the established procedure is used);
  • development and, if necessary, correction of UAV flight routes and programs;
  • storage of a database of electronic terrain maps (ETM) of the region or subject of the Russian Federation where the complex is supposed to be operated, or the area of ​​its operation at a scale of 1:25,000, their transformation to a scale of 1:50,000;
  • own topographic referencing and orientation of the complex;
  • training of the complex calculation without real UAV launches;
  • monitoring the complex’s own operability with detection of malfunctions down to an individual unit;
  • prelaunch and preflight preparation of the UAV.

The control unit is generally intended to solve the following tasks:

  • placing the UAV before launch;
  • conducting preflight and prelaunch preparation (together with the control unit);
  • carrying out UAV launches.

The control unit is generally intended to solve the following tasks:

  • preparation of the launch device and UAV for launch;
  • checking the operability of the UAV and its central part (in the absence of a TPM, this function is performed by the NPU);
  • implementing UAV launches;
  • short-term (up to 6 months) storage and transportation of 1 to 8 UAVs depending on the UAV weight and the transport base of the NP in containers (in the absence of a TPM, this function is performed by the NPU or TM);
  • storage and transportation of fuels and lubricants (F&L) for several UAV launches.

MTO is generally intended to solve the following tasks:

  • search for and selection of UAVs at the landing site;
  • delivery of UAVs from the landing site to the TM or to the launch position (LP) to the PU (TPM);
  • cleaning, drying and refueling of all UAV systems and mechanisms;
  • monitoring the operability of UAV equipment and their power plants;
  • minor repairs of individual parts of UAVs;
  • carrying out routine maintenance of UAVs;
  • de-preservation of UAVs, packaging of UAVs that cannot be restored in the field into transport containers for shipment to manufacturers. The complexes included in the police aviation units may not have MTO.

The TM is generally intended to solve the following tasks:

  • transportation of additional UAVs in containers;
  • storage and transportation of fuel and lubricants for several UAV launches;
  • delivery of light and medium UAVs from the landing site to the SP.

The TEM is generally intended to:

  • transportation of additional UAVs in containers;
  • storage and transportation of fuel and lubricants for several UAV launches;
  • delivery of UAVs from the landing site to the launch position.

The UAV is designed to solve the following tasks:

  • delivery of the target load (TL) to the task execution area;
  • transmission of visual or other information to the NPC;
  • transmission of its coordinates and other telemetry information to the NPC;
  • application   of special   strike weapons.
Aerodynamic configuration of UAV

As for the aerodynamic configuration of UAV, when solving the problems of observing a stationary object, preference should be given to VTOL UAV, although in some cases it is significantly more expensive than fixed-wing UAV. When solving other problems, the choice of configuration is not fundamental. Flight performance characteristics (FPC) of UAV also depend on the class of the complex, the type of tasks being solved, their average duration, etc.

In general, it can be noted that the main flight characteristics should be as follows:

1) UAV flight duration — not less than 4 hours (not less than 1 hour for light systems);

2) UAV operating altitudes — 50-500 m (up to 1000 m for heavy systems) above the underlying surface;

3) UAV service ceiling — not less than 3000 m above sea level;

4) UAV flight speed — up to 300 km/h. The complex's NPU must be able to control at least two UAVs in flight and receive video information from at least one of them. Receiving telemetry data or information that is not related to transmission over a broadband channel must be carried out from at least two UAVs simultaneously.

UAV target load

To present requirements for the payload, it is first necessary to define the terms. Very often, many sources provide different definitions of the concepts of «payload» and «target load» for different tasks; these concepts are often confused.

Therefore, for this series of articles we will define:

1. Payload (PL) — all UAV equipment except for the airframe and propulsion system.

2. Target load — part of the PL intended to solve specific problems. For example, for solving observation problems, the PL will be observation equipment, and for strike problems — a sighting and observation complex and weapons.

The type of PL and its weight and size characteristics depend on the nature of the problems to be solved and the UAV's performance characteristics.

Depending on the tasks to be solved [2], the following can be used as the CN:

  • color or black-and-white television camera(s) of side (BO) or plan view (PlO);
  • thermal imaging (range 3-5 or 8-14 µm) camera BO or PlO;
  • digital aerial cameras PlO;
  • spectrozonal equipment BO or PlO;
  • laser-luminescent equipment;
  • radio relay equipment;
  • radio jamming equipment;
  • gas analysis equipment;
  • ionizing radiation measurement equipment;
  • aiming and precision dropping equipment;
  • special ammunition, etc.

The CN can be manufactured either as a replaceable version or rigidly connected to a specific UAV. Also, depending on the take-off weight of the UAV, a combined CN can be used.

The communication facilities are intended for communication between the mobile elements of the complex, between the crew members, between the complex's control center and external subscribers (information consumers, the head of the operational search and rescue mission or the head of the operational headquarters, etc.).

The communication facilities must be selected from those adopted by the Internal Affairs Directorate and have built-in speech masking devices. It must be possible to transmit both individual video frames and video information to external subscribers upon their request.

Accuracy of determining the coordinates of objects

Requirements for the accuracy of determining the coordinates of objects depend on whose interests the complex operates, on the tasks being solved and on the objects of work. In general, the accuracy of determining coordinates (The standard deviation of the communication of the Internal Affairs (police) department in typical conditions of using the complex.) can be up to 10-20 m when using a satellite navigation system and up to 50-70 m in other cases.

Radioelectronic protection (REP) and electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)

Requirements for electronic warfare can be significantly reduced, since the enemy is unlikely to have the necessary electronic warfare equipment, which will reduce the cost of the complex. However, it is necessary that the information transmitted from and to the UAV be encrypted to prevent accidental interception by various equipment, including household television and radio receivers.

The radio lines of the complex must ensure EMC with standard radio equipment-

Survivability and resistance to external influencing factors (EIF)

Requirements for survivability and resistance to explosives can also be significantly reduced, which will also lead to a reduction in the cost of the complex.

The mobile units of the LF complex can be painted using the color scheme adopted by the Department of Internal Affairs, or they can have any color scheme, including camouflage. UAVs can have different color options. To solve problems related to monitoring the traffic situation, finding ways to bypass traffic jams on highways, working in areas of natural disasters and catastrophes, preventing offenses, the UAV can be painted in bright colors (orange) or in the color scheme of the Department of Internal Affairs. Requirements for acoustic and optical visibility during ORM or SO may be more stringent. In this case, it is necessary that the UAV is not detectable to the naked eye against the sky from a distance of up to 300 m and a flight altitude of 300 m with a probability of at least 0.8 and is not detectable in the acoustic range (without the use of special equipment) with a background noise level of up to 30 dB at a distance of up to 300 m. There are no requirements for visibility in the IR and radar ranges, or for protection against weapons of mass destruction, which will also lead to a reduction in the cost of the sample.

The reliability indicators of the LF complex must meet the requirements of the relevant GOST and regulatory documents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia. As for the reliability indicators of the UAV, they must be much higher than in the Armed Forces. The probability of failure-free operation of the UAV during one flight must be at least 0.99. The designated resource of the UAV, taking into account the replacement of aerodynamic surfaces damaged during landing, must be at least 100 launches.

Requirements for ergonomics and technical aesthetics, for operation, ease of maintenance, repair and storage, transportability requirements must meet the requirements of GOST and regulatory documents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia.

As for safety during operation, the design of the complex and its elements must comply with the requirements of the «Occupational Safety Standards System». The design of the complex must provide (depending on its class) organizational and technical measures to protect personnel from electric shock, electromagnetic radiation, high pressure, ignition of fuel and lubricants, liquid nitrogen, and safety of rigging operations. The design of the UAV and the launcher must provide measures to protect against spontaneous activation of the UAV launch device and self-activation of the parachute release system (during parachute landing of the UAV). Since electromagnetic radiation sources can be used in the complex during remote control of the UAV, the limits of the spatial sector that poses a danger of electromagnetic radiation to personnel must be determined, and organizational and technical measures to prevent radiation must be provided.

The degrees of secrecy of all types of information circulating in the complex and during information exchange with external subscribers are in accordance with the classification marks installed on them.

When loading special software and information classified as secret, and in the process of subsequent work with them, a system of protection against unauthorized access (SZI NSD) must be provided in the complex, including a set of organizational, software, technical means, systems and measures to protect this information. SZI NSD must meet the requirements of the FSTEC of Russia.

The requirements for standardization, unification and manufacturability must comply with the regulatory documents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia. Since the requirements for complete technological independence from other countries are not strictly set, the use of imported element base will reduce the weight and size characteristics of a number of units, blocks and elements of the complex and reduce the cost of its production and operation. Since there can be several UAVs and types of CN, it is advisable to develop a standard range of both UAVs and CN. At the same time, the LF of the complex should be as unified as possible, regardless of the type of UAV and CN used. The computing facilities of the complex should be built using hardware platforms adopted in the ATS. The operating system, general system software, programming tools should be selected from among those permitted for use in the ATS.

Design requirements may vary for different types of the complex, but at the same time the requirement for a minimum of aviation specifics remains uniform. In addition, the UAV design must not contain pyrotechnic devices.

Requirements for types of support

Requirements for metrological support must meet the requirements of GOST and the guidelines of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia.

The software of the complex (general and special), if necessary, must be certified by the certification bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for information security requirements.

The information and linguistic support of the complex must be compatible with the information and linguistic support of the ATC automation systems.

The topographic and geodetic support of the complexes includes the provision of ECM and/or conventional topographic maps adopted by the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. The orientation of the NPU and the antennas of the channels on-board the NPU on the ground must be carried out using satellite and inertial orientation systems. The position of the NPU (if necessary) must be referenced using the built-in ground equipment of the consumer of the GLONASS or GPS system.

Meteorological support can be provided by nearby meteorological stations, and if necessary, the complex can include a meteorological kit of the DMK-1 or Borispol type (or others accepted for supply to the Ministry of Internal Affairs).

Training facilities (UTS)

Since there are currently practically no educational institutions in Russia that train specialists in the operation of UAV systems, the presence of a training facility in the complex is of great importance.

 The training and technical support should include:

  • special software;
  • educational and methodological manuals and guidelines;
  • color sketches of training posters. The training and technical support should also include simulation programs that reproduce combat situations without real UAV launches, including emergency situations, as well as sets of video images obtained during real UAV flights (both training and operational) from the optical-electronic central station, for training decoder operators.

Thus, summing up the above, it is necessary to note the following.

Many TTTs for UAV systems that can work in the interests of the police are less stringent or are not presented at all compared to similar systems developed in the interests of the Armed Forces. This is due to both the specifics of the tasks being solved and the conditions of use.

As a result, police systems may be cheaper both to develop and to manufacture. The answer to the question of how much cheaper requires additional research involving industrial enterprises.

At the same time, a number of provisions expressed in this article require additional clarification and research.

References

1. Air Code of the Russian Federation of March 19, 1997, No. 60-FZ (as amended on July 18, 2009). [Electronic resource]. — Access mode: http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi. (date of access April 23, 2010).

2. Mityushin D.A. Issues of using UAV systems in the activities of the internal affairs agencies of the Russian Federation //Special equipment. — 2011. — No. 1. — P. 26-30.

3. GOST RV 15.201-2000. System of development and launching into production of military equipment. Tactical and technical (technical) assignment for the implementation of experimental design work. (Put into effect on 01.01.2001).

4. Combat Regulations of the Ground Forces. Part III. Platoon, tank squad. — M.: Military Publishing House, 2002. — 129 p.

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