Checking people and their hand luggage for the presence of sabotage and terrorist weapons.

#sabotage and terrorist means, #DTS

Control of people and their hand luggage for the presence of sabotage and terrorist means.

In recent years, due to significant geopolitical and economic changes, the activity of various kinds of extremist organizations has increased, which are increasingly resorting to terrorism to achieve their goals.

Terrorist attacks, unfortunately, have become a part of our lives and from a hypothetical threat have turned into a problem that is acute for law enforcement agencies and security services.

Thanks to the measures taken recently, law enforcement agencies have managed to bring down the wave of terrorist attacks.

However, it has not yet been possible to completely solve this problem, since there are still hotbeds of tension in the territory of the Russian Federation and adjacent states, which are the main breeding ground for terrorism.

The fight against terrorism is a multifaceted task, solved primarily by political and economic measures.

However, the direct fight against terrorism is the prerogative of law enforcement agencies.

Among the tasks of identifying the plans and intentions of terrorists, cutting off channels for obtaining weapons and explosives, identifying specific perpetrators of terrorist acts, an important place is occupied by control over the flow of people, cargo and mail.

At present, the following are primarily considered sabotage and terrorist means (STM):

• combat firearms (CF);
• explosive devices (ED), both standard (hand grenades, mines) and homemade;
• explosive substances (ES) (as the main element of explosive devices), which can be delivered and sent separately;
• radioactive substances (RS) of high activity (leading to illness within a few days).

The existing possibility of using TDS against a protected object must be constantly taken into account.

This is primarily dictated by the colossal material and moral damage, and possibly victims, that may follow in the event of their successful use.

The practice of using TDS has its own history.

Airplanes, ships, and embassies were seized with the help of firearms and explosive devices.

Government institutions, schools, banks, and airports were subjected to explosions or threats of explosions.

Over the years of combating terrorism, the most effective methods and technical means have proven to be those that block the channels for delivering explosives to the locations of terrorist attacks.

The main channels for delivering explosives should be considered to be:

• hidden carrying by people under clothing or in hand luggage;
• hidden delivery among incoming cargo;
• mail channel (explosive mail).

Radioactive substances can be delivered to a protected area not only for sabotage purposes, but also accidentally: contaminated shoes, clothes, etc.

In addition, it is possible to try to bring valuable radioactive substances (fissile materials, radionuclides for medical purposes) into individual safes. This poses a threat to the health of personnel and visitors.

Thus, people and their hand luggage should be monitored for explosive devices and firearms in order to prevent these types of DTS from being brought into a protected building, protected area or facility.

Depending on the type of protected facility and the access control system adopted there, the following may be monitored:

• passengers on transport;
• staff of institutions;
• visitors or clients of offices and banks;
• spectators at cultural events.

Despite the diversity of the listed categories of people and facilities, this task allows for general approaches to its solution.

Usually, to check people and their hand luggage, stationary posts are equipped, where checking for the presence of DTS is carried out separately or combined with other types of control, for example, access control.

Equipping posts for checking for the presence of DTS includes the installation of special technical means and the organization of a certain order of control and decision-making.

The wide variety of DTS, even when considering their individual types by their weight and size characteristics, design, materials included in their composition, the use of various methods of concealment and camouflage, creates significant difficulties in determining common characteristic features by which they could be clearly identified by special equipment.

Therefore, there is no universal device that allows solving all problems and identifying all types and varieties of DTS.

The most effective is considered to be an integrated approach based on the optimal combination of various types of technical means and organizational measures.

This article provides basic ideas about the ways of practical implementation of such an approach.

Characteristic features of detection of covertly carried sabotage and terrorist means.

Concealed carrying under clothing and in hand luggage is the most common way of delivering sabotage and terrorist means to the place of terrorist attacks.

Most often it is used to carry firearms.

This is due to the fact that a firearm must be with a person preparing to commit a terrorist act.

Firearms in their complete and disassembled form have well-known and quite specific forms of units and parts. However, their camouflage can cause difficulties in detection.

In this regard, two methods of camouflage can be distinguished when carrying a weapon: concealed and specially concealed.

Simply concealed carrying of a weapon imposes minor requirements on clothing and weapons. Its main distinguishing feature is the ability to carry the largest and most powerful pistols.

Special concealed carrying introduces stricter restrictions on both the size and type of weapon and the clothing worn.

With this method, the weapon can be hidden under thick clothing, in the lapels of shoes or boots.

Explosive devices (with their subsequent installation at the site of the supposed explosion) and radioactive substances can also be carried under clothing or in hand luggage.

Carry-on explosive devices, both standard and homemade, can be camouflaged as household items.

Camouflage is intended to prevent the explosive device from being recognized before it is triggered and to force the target to perform actions with the camouflaged device that lead to the latter's explosion.

Actions with a camouflaged explosive device that lead to its detonation are natural for the items they are camouflaged as.

The specifics of camouflage are based on the physical condition of the explosive used, the design of the elements of the improvised explosive device or standard mine-blasting equipment.

A wide variety of items, usually household items, can be used as camouflage for improvised explosive devices.

In practice, we have encountered an electric pocket flashlight, a fan, a lamp, a radio, an electric stove, cans, boxes, and thermoses.

Radioactive substances can be delivered to premises in protective containers made of heavy metals, or without containers (if the person carrying the radioactive substance does not know that he/she has it).

This method of delivering radioactive substances to a protected facility can be used by all categories of people who have access to it.

In general, they form flows of people through checkpoints. In specific cases, these flows can be formed in different ways.

The main characteristics of flows of people are:

• established passage productivity;
• type of clothing (in outerwear, without outerwear);
• degree of restrictions on hand luggage;
• presence of other types of control (for example, access control).

To control people for the presence of DTS under their clothing or in hand luggage, overt control is most often used.

The technology for this is currently quite fully developed; it allows for control of flows of people with virtually any parameters of the characteristics listed above.

There is a wide range of technical means implementing various methods that ensure the effectiveness of control.

There are also methods and equipment for covert control, the capabilities of which, however, are significantly limited.

When organizing control of people flows, it is necessary, first of all, to know the parameters of the above characteristics. They determine the order of control, the choice and quantity of technical means, the number and qualifications of service personnel.

The study of controlled flows of people and the conditions in which this control is carried out includes the following issues:

• characteristic features of the layout of passages;
• distribution of flow density over time during the day;
• classification of carry-on baggage and personal items;
• determination of the level of electromagnetic interference in places where equipment is installed;
• determination of the amount of natural background radiation.

During the study, the necessary statistical data is collected, on the basis of which the qualitative and quantitative parameters of the flow characteristics are determined.

Considering that the currently existing weapon detection equipment is based on electromagnetic methods, it is often necessary to conduct estimated measurements of electromagnetic interference levels.

Increased interference levels may be due to the passage of power cables in the walls and floor, the close location of power panels, computer networks, etc.

The purpose of the measurements is not only to determine the level of interference, but also, if necessary, to find ways to eliminate it or to select a location for the equipment with minimal influence of the established sources of interference.

The study of controlled flows of people and control conditions is called «situational analysis».

Based on the results of the situational analysis, a conclusion is made on the following issues:

• layout of the inspection site (its width, area for equipment, possibility of separating zones «before inspection» and «after inspection», etc.);
• the nature of clothing of the people being checked (whether they have outerwear and hats or not), the nature and statistics of the most frequently encountered personal items and carry-on baggage;
• the presence of places with a high level of electromagnetic interference and their sources;
• the need to conduct other types of control simultaneously with the control for the presence of TDS, for example, checking passes.

Based on this conclusion, a project can be developed for equipping a place for checking the presence of TDS under people's clothes and in their hand luggage with the specified parameters: control performance, probability of detection and false alarm, technical equipment, number and qualifications of personnel.

Typical approaches to equipping checkpoints for people and their hand luggage for the presence of sabotage and terrorist means.

Posts for checking people for the presence of DTS under clothing and in hand luggage can be either permanent or temporary.

Their number is determined by the number of independent flows of people subject to control.

For example, if separate entrances are organized for visitors and clients on one side, and employees on the other, then two checkpoints are required: one for each flow.

The nature of checkpoints is determined by the frequency of checks (constant, periodic, episodic) and the conditions in which they have to be organized.

Table 1 provides a list of technical means by which people and hand luggage are checked for the presence of DTS.

Table 1

Control of people and their hand luggage is carried out independently.

In practice, two parallel flows are organized with points of intersection.

To check people for weapons and explosive devices under their clothes, stationary and hand-held metal detectors are used.

The main technical means of inspecting hand luggage are X-ray introscopes (recently, these are low-dose X-ray television introscopes — RTI).

A person must pass through a stationary metal detector without hand luggage.

It is advisable to install stationary radiometer sensors directly at the entrance, when a person still has hand luggage with him.

When they are triggered, the radiation source is detected using a radiation search alarm.

The same equipment is used to detect explosives both on a person and in hand luggage — explosive vapor detectors.

When organizing checkpoints, it is necessary to take into account the mutual influence of devices on each other, as well as the effect of external interference on the operation of the equipment.

Some models of stationary metal detectors cannot be used more than one at a checkpoint without special modification. This must be taken into account when equipping posts for large flows of people.

Manual and stationary metal detectors can mutually influence each other when used together.

Mutual influence of X-ray equipment and metal detectors is eliminated by the correct choice of their mutual arrangement.

The sources of external interference for metal detectors are, first of all, sources of strong electromagnetic fields (power transformers, magnetic switches, pulsed electrical signal transmission lines, etc.), large metal objects moving at a fairly close distance.

The general layout of the equipment of a stationary control post is shown in Fig. 1
(RM — radiometer; MD metal detector; VKU — video control device of the X-ray television introscope; RTI — X-ray television introscope).

In principle, a temporary control post can differ in composition from a stationary one only by replacing stationary equipment with portable or handheld equipment.

The choice of technical means for control posts and the direction of their use are determined by two factors: efficiency and minimal possible damage to the controlled object.

These factors explain the use of mainly electromagnetic methods and devices.

They are quite effective in detecting firearms and large metal objects under clothing, are selective in relation to personal items made of metal and do not harm the health of the controlled person.

Fig. 2 shows data published by the Italian company CEIA on the effective (curve 1) and maximum (curve 2) levels of harmful effects of low-frequency electromagnetic fields on people.

Sections 1 and 2 marked on the graph refer to the levels of exposure created by domestic equipment (Poisk-Z) and equipment from the company CEIA, respectively.

As can be seen from the figure, the exposure levels of search equipment are significantly lower than those that, according to the company, can harm human health.

X-ray equipment is used to check carry-on baggage, packages, luggage and similar objects.

In this case, it is carry-on baggage.

Modern models of this equipment create minimal dose loads on the examined object, which do not affect film and photo materials, chemicals and drugs.

For the best models of X-ray introscopes, this is less than 100 microroentgens per examination.

Other types of equipment used at the checkpoint (explosive vapor detectors and radiometers), being passive, do not affect the controlled object and can be used to check people and their hand luggage.

The effectiveness of explosive vapor detectors in this case largely depends on the nature of the object being examined, external conditions and the qualifications of the actions taken to collect gas samples.

Correct consideration of all objective and subjective factors allows to implement high sensitivity of modern equipment.

The best examples of this equipment allow to detect TNT vapors having a concentration in the air of 10-10 g/cm.

The efficiency of explosive vapor detectors is affected by air temperature and humidity.

To take into account the influence of external interference on the operation of devices and their mutual influence on each other, it is necessary to correctly select the location of the control post and plan the placement of the technical means included in it.

The selection of types and quantities of means for a control post is carried out, as noted above, based on the characteristics of the flows of people that are supposed to be controlled.

All these issues should be considered in a complex and interconnected manner.

For example, it is possible to limit oneself to a smaller number of technical means, having taken organizational measures to form a controlled flow of people.

It is possible to do without X-ray equipment by introducing restrictions on hand luggage, or to reduce the number of stationary metal detectors by singling out from the general flow of people subject to control (visitors, temporary personnel, etc.).

Figure 3 provides a diagram of the placement of equipment and the order of movement of hand luggage and people for a control post without an X-ray television introscope as a possible example.

One of the possible options for checking people for the presence of a DTS can be called covert control. To ensure covert checking, the control post is equipped with special equipment that is camouflaged as interior items.

In addition, a strictly defined route of movement must be ensured at the control location.

The type of hand luggage with the controlled person must also be limited to a business card, a handbag, a folder for papers.

Figure 4 shows a diagram of the placement of equipment for such a post and a diagram of the route through it.

In addition to the stationary metal detector, portable metal detectors are used, covertly placed on the body of the checkpoint personnel.

Procedure for examining people and their hand luggage for the presence of DTS.

Checking is carried out for the presence of firearms, bladed weapons, explosive devices, radioactive sources under clothing or in hand luggage carried by visitors or employees.

The recommended composition of the equipment, as already noted, is as follows:

• stationary X-ray television introscope (RTI);
• stationary metal detector;
• stationary radiation monitoring system;
• hand-held metal detector;
• portable explosive vapor detector;
• portable radiometer.

The controlled person is directed by a security officer at the entrance to the RTI for hand luggage control.

The contents of the controlled hand luggage are monitored on a video monitoring device installed on the duty officer's desk.

Then the controlled person goes to a stationary metal detector. Hand luggage is left on the object table next to the metal detector, and the person goes through its arch.

If the stationary metal detector is not triggered and the hand luggage does not arouse suspicion, then the visitor goes to the interior.

If the hand luggage raises suspicions, a more thorough inspection is carried out using a hand-held metal detector and an explosive vapor detector.

If the checkpoint employee believes that such an inspection is insufficient, he/she asks the owner to open the hand luggage and present the item that raised suspicions.

If a stationary metal detector is triggered for a visitor, the person must also be additionally inspected using an explosive vapor detector and a hand-held metal detector.

These devices allow you to identify the exact location on the visitor's body of the object that caused them to go off.

After which the security guard must demand that this object be presented.

A stationary radiation monitoring system is installed directly at the entrance and constantly monitors the radiation situation.

If, upon arrival of another visitor, this system shows an increase in background radiation, then it is necessary to use a portable radiometer to make sure that this visitor is the cause of the increase in background radiation.

If it is confirmed that he has a source of radioactivity, he must be detained to clarify the circumstances and hand him over to the competent authorities.

Carry-on baggage should be considered suspicious if the X-ray image of the contents shows elements characteristic of explosive devices, or if there are opaque areas.

Table 2 provides a list of the components of explosive devices.

Table 2

If you find hand luggage that is suspected of being explosive, you must obtain detailed explanations from its owner.

If the owner of the hand luggage seems suspicious in his behavior, he must be detained until representatives of the competent authorities arrive.

If a dangerous situation arises, the security service management must immediately contact the nearest police station or a specialized unit and, upon their instructions, pass on all available information.

Until the arrival of bomb disposal experts, carry-on baggage should be considered explosive.

Access to the danger zone must be closed.

The boundaries of this zone are determined taking into account specific conditions in order to ensure maximum distance from the explosive object.

You should not:

• touch, move or move carry-on baggage;
• cover it;
• stay near it;
• use radio equipment nearby;
• create any acoustic, thermal vibrations or seismic vibrations near suspicious hand luggage.

Conclusion.

It has already been noted above that the task of organizing control of people and their hand luggage for the presence of TDS is not the only one in ensuring the security of a protected facility.

There are almost always several other channels through which TDS are secretly delivered to carry out sabotage.

Explosive devices, radioactive substances and firearms can be sent by mail, carried in cargo.

Weapons and radioactive substances can also be carried to the facility in cargo.

A comprehensive approach to ensuring the security of protected facilities involves organizing control at all possible channels of entry of explosive devices to them. Otherwise, all efforts to control some channels may be nullified by the lack of it on others.

All possible channels for delivering TDS to the site of a suspected terrorist act have now been well studied.

Equipment has been created that ensures effective control, and technologies have been developed for checking the locations of TDS concealment on each channel, used for their delivery or storage.

Statistical material has been accumulated on the characteristic features of various types of TDS, distinguishing them from the background of accompanying or camouflaging objects.

A comprehensively trained and equipped security service with modern technology is capable of ensuring the safety of a protected facility from the use of TDS against it.