CHANGING THE NATURE OF TERRORISM AND THE PROBLEMS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT IN THE FIGHT AGAINST ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS IN THE CHECHEN REPUBLIC.

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CHANGING THE NATURE OF TERRORISM AND PROBLEMS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT IN THE FIGHT AGAINST ILLEGAL ARMED FORMATIONS IN THE CHECHEN REPUBLIC.

CHANGING THE NATURE OF TERRORISM AND PROBLEMS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT IN THE FIGHT AGAINST ILLEGAL ARMED FORMATIONS IN THE CHECHEN REPUBLIC

Chesnokov V.F., professor of the Academy of the FSB of Russia, candidate of legal sciences, associate professor,
Honored worker of the Higher School of the Russian Federation

CHANGING THE NATURE OF TERRORISM AND PROBLEMS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT IN THE FIGHT AGAINST ILLEGAL ARMED FORMATIONS IN THE CHECHEN REPUBLIC

The emergence of crisis situations and armed conflicts in the territory of the Russian Federation and a number of CIS countries, South-Eastern Europe and Central Asia have a significant impact on the nature and content of political extremism and terrorism and require an urgent need for scientific understanding of the processes taking place. The experience of combating terrorism in the North Caucasus shows that the tactics of terrorists, the number of forces and means they attract to achieve their goals, the scale and intensity of terrorist acts, the scope of the terrorist movement in the Chechen Republic as a whole differ significantly from the established ideas about terrorism and require significant adjustments to the modern practice of counter-terrorism.

First of all, it should be noted that in the North Caucasus region we are not talking about lone terrorists or small groups, but rather large terrorist armed formations. The number of such structures can reach hundreds and even several thousand people.

In the region, where a huge conflict potential has accumulated, there is a transition from isolated terrorist acts to large-scale terrorist actions, coinciding in form with classical military actions. The events in the Chechen Republic and Dagestan indicate a transformation of the goals of terrorist activity of extremist forces. Terrorism has become the most important means of organizing armed rebellions, violent overthrow of the constitutional order, violent seizure of power, undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, achieving military-political goals, based on the general concept of interstate and intrastate confrontation using armed combat. Along with this, there is a steady growth and expansion of the scale, territorial and spatial boundaries of terrorist acts committed with the aim of violating public safety in individual localities and populated areas, intimidating the population or influencing the adoption of decisions by government bodies that are beneficial to terrorists.

Modern Russian terrorism is characterized by: strengthening the tactical and organizational level of preparation and implementation of terrorist acts, improving the quality of weapons and technical equipment of terrorists, as well as the use of means of armed struggle. The use of modern scientific and technical achievements in terrorist activities, the terrorists' focus on achieving maximum efficiency of terrorist acts by undermining objects of increased environmental danger have led to the emergence of new types of terrorism: technological, nuclear, chemical, biological, cybernetic, etc.

As events in the Chechen Republic show, the successful functioning of the terrorist movement is connected with the formation of two interconnected organizational links — the armed underground and the partisan movement. The creation of conspiratorial organizational structures of the urban underground is facilitated by the objective need to staff the emerging state and economic institutions at the expense of the population remaining on the territory of the Chechen Republic, among whom there is a significant number of supporters of the separatists.

The basis of the partisan movement emerging in the North Caucasus are illegal armed formations (IAF). A characteristic feature of their functioning is the creation of a fairly broad and ramified infrastructure that ensures the vital activity and reproduction of terrorist groups. The main elements of such infrastructure include: base areas for the deployment of IAF, terrorist training centers, transit bases, routes for the movement and delivery of weapons and material resources. At the same time, there are obvious attempts to use the territory of not only the Russian Federation, but also the neighboring republics of the CIS (Georgia, Azerbaijan), as well as other foreign states (Afghanistan, the UAE, etc.). Representative offices of parallel authorities or so-called “governments in exile”, information and propaganda centers for separatists, recreation and treatment centers, recruitment points for “mercenaries”, organizations for the collection of financial and material resources, etc. are located on the territory of foreign states.

Western experts also speak about the emerging trend of changing the content of terrorism. According to NATO analysts, the 21st century will be marked by the emergence of a new generation of military conflicts, which will be characterized by the absence of classical military confrontation between two or more states. Armed confrontation may arise with structures that do not have direct state affiliation. According to French General Bernard de Bressie, “the conflicts of the next millennium will be “fourth generation wars”, in which the enemy will not be another state, but extremist armed groups, drug cartels, syndicates, organizations of various kinds of revolutionaries, religious associations, etc.”

Assessing the current military-political situation and the results of the counter-terrorist operation in the Chechen Republic, the “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” emphasizes that terrorism in modern conditions is the main internal military threat and has reached a scale that is detrimental to the military security of the Russian Federation. The lessons of the two Chechen campaigns show that the main goals of eliminating the terrorist movement in this republic have not yet been achieved. The change in the nature, content, scale, strategy and tactics of terrorism indicate that it is impossible to solve the problem of eliminating illegal armed groups in the North Caucasus region within the framework of the adopted national strategy for combating terrorism, as well as the concept of the activities of security agencies in this area.

In recent years, the state authorities of the Russian Federation and the leadership of the FSB of Russia have taken a number of measures aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism. The Federal Anti-Terrorist Commission and corresponding anti-terrorist commissions in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation have been created. The legal basis for the activities of executive authorities in the field of combating terrorism has been laid (Federal Law «On Combating Terrorism»). A nationwide program for combating crime has been developed and is being implemented. In August 1999, a counter-terrorist operation was launched to eliminate illegal armed groups in the Chechen Republic. A joint group of troops and law enforcement agencies was formed. The forms and methods of joint actions of law enforcement agencies in the field of combating terrorism are being improved. In January 2001, the leadership of the counter-terrorist operation was assigned to the FSB of Russia and a regional operational headquarters was formed.

However, the actions of the executive authorities in the fight against terrorism in the Chechen Republic do not yet meet the requirements. In our opinion, the main difficulties and unresolved issues are: the absence of a state program to stabilize the situation in the North Caucasus region and resolve the conflict in the Chechen Republic; imperfect legal regulation of the activities of law enforcement agencies in the context of an armed conflict; low efficiency of managing the activities of law enforcement agencies in the Chechen Republic; weak interaction between law enforcement agencies and the military command; discrepancy between the organization and tactics of operational-search activities and the practice of military combat against illegal armed groups; insufficient professional training of the military command and the leadership and operational staff of law enforcement agencies.

One of the reasons that significantly reduces the effectiveness of security agencies in the fight against terrorism is the imperfection of the management system, its inconsistency with the current operational situation and the nature of the tasks facing law enforcement agencies in the armed conflict zone. This is largely due to the inconsistency of the tasks and competence of law enforcement agencies, enshrined in federal laws (“On the Federal Security Service Agencies in the Russian Federation”, “On the Police”, “On Operational Investigative Activities”) and the target setting for the use of the Armed Forces, other troops and agencies in an internal armed conflict, contained in the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.

The Military Doctrine emphasizes that the main objectives of using the Armed Forces, other troops and bodies in an armed conflict are the defeat and liquidation of illegal armed groups, the creation of conditions for a full-scale settlement of the conflict (restoration of the rule of law and constitutional order, stabilization of the socio-political situation). However, this target setting is not enshrined in either the above-mentioned federal laws or other regulatory legal acts. Moreover, the Federal Law “On the Federal Security Service Bodies in the Russian Federation” clearly establishes the competence of security agencies to “identify, prevent and suppress the activities of illegal armed groups.” The legislator orients security agencies to the use of primarily operational forms and methods to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups, but not to the liquidation of their participants. The Federal Law “On Combating Terrorism” does not contain provisions defining the powers of counter-terrorism units and other forces of executive authorities to liquidate illegal armed groups.

An analysis of the activities of security agencies in the Chechen Republic shows that the established theory and practice of combating terrorism and other threats to national security are oriented toward the use by law enforcement agencies of primarily covert forces and means and covert methods of combating terrorism. Special forces units are responsible for conducting the forceful stage of counter-terrorism operations. Therefore, individual leaders and operational officers often do not delve into the organization and tactics of conducting operational and combat activities, but focus mainly on conducting the most typical variants of special operations (freeing hostages, vehicles, environmental hazards, etc.). In this regard, a significant portion of the leadership and operational staff is of the widespread view that the military phase of the counter-terrorism operation in the Chechen Republic is the prerogative of the military command and does not cover the scope of activities of law enforcement agencies. According to the majority of employees, law enforcement agencies should limit their participation in military operations by providing the military command with operational information that is important for planning and conducting military operations. As a consequence of this, employees of territorial law enforcement agencies very rarely take direct part in military operations to eliminate illegal armed groups. Modern practice has not developed forms of such participation of law enforcement agencies in military operations.

Unfortunately, interdepartmental and departmental regulatory legal acts do not provide an answer to the question of how and in what way territorial law enforcement agencies should participate in the operations conducted by the military command to eliminate illegal armed groups. The forms and procedure for interaction between territorial security agencies and internal affairs agencies with the command of military units during military operations and service and combat activities are not fixed in the regulatory order. Nor do the regulatory legal documents of the Federal Anti-Terrorist Commission provide an answer to these questions. In practice, this often leads to disunity in the actions of troops and law enforcement agencies, a decrease in the effectiveness of military activities, and insufficiently full use of the capabilities of the military command in the interests of security agencies for the timely detection, prevention and suppression of terrorist activity on the territory of the Chechen Republic. It should also be noted that the weakness of such interaction significantly limits the ability of law enforcement agencies to organize operational activities in the territory under the control of militants, and the stable functioning of operational units in the conditions of force, psychological and armed influence of illegal armed groups on operational personnel.

Historical experience convincingly shows that one of the characteristic patterns of law enforcement activities in special conditions is their subordination to the political and military goals of a military conflict, localization and elimination of the consequences of an emergency, close interconnection and coordination of operational activities with state activities to repel aggression, stabilize the military-political and operational situation in the area of ​​a crisis situation and armed conflict. It seems that such interconnection and coordination should also be characteristic of operational activities of law enforcement agencies and military actions of troops in operations to eliminate illegal armed groups. At the same time, the specifics of the preparation and conduct of modern special operations to combat illegal armed groups, carried out by joint efforts of security agencies, military command and internal affairs agencies, should be taken into account.

A special operation is understood to be a set of political, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, counterintelligence, military, security, information-psychological, investigative and other measures and actions of federal troops (forces) and executive authorities, coordinated in purpose, objectives, place and time, carried out under the leadership of a specially authorized body according to a single plan and concept in the interests of eliminating illegal armed groups. The characteristic features of such operations are: specific goals and objectives compared to classical combat operations; close interconnection of military and non-military means; increased role of special methods, techniques and actions (intelligence, counterintelligence, sabotage, etc.); priority of political methods and means of resolving armed conflict; limited use of military and other violence; compliance with the norms of international humanitarian law and ensuring the rule of law in protecting the rights of the individual and the interests of the population in the conflict zone.

The most characteristic features of a joint special operation to eliminate illegal armed groups include: combined actions of the armed forces and other troops of the Russian Federation, law enforcement agencies and special services, as well as other ministries and departments; the comprehensive nature of political, economic, diplomatic, information-psychological, military, intelligence, counterintelligence, operational-search, security, criminal-law, investigative and other measures aimed at achieving a single goal; implementation of a special operation within the framework of national guidelines for the prevention and resolution of armed conflict under the leadership of specially created temporary bodies of state power and administration at the federal and regional levels; creation of a special organizational structure (joint command, headquarters) and a special grouping of forces and means to manage the special operation; the use of special forms and methods of troop actions (special tactics) using various tactical methods (search, blocking, covering the probable movement of the enemy, ambush, encirclement, raid, pursuit), and the use of special types of outfits (search group, ambush, checkpoint, checkpoint, patrol, convoy, secret, patrol, etc.); restrictions on the number and composition of the troop group and their use, due to the goals and objectives to be achieved during the operation, the various capabilities available to federal agencies and troops in the armed conflict zone; the need to coordinate the activities with interested CIS countries.

The counter-terrorist operation in the Chechen Republic is characterized by: the importance and scale of the operational tasks being solved; the degree of public danger and threat to security and national interests of Chechen gangs; a fairly high level of organization and tactics of the militants' actions; a large spatial scope; the heterogeneity of the measures and methods of action applied by the federal forces; the specificity of the tasks they perform within the framework of the competence enshrined in federal legislation; the absence of effective legal regulation of the activities of federal forces to restore constitutional order and ensure public safety; the ineffectiveness of the actions of the federal executive authorities and the executive authorities of the Chechen Republic in resolving political and economic problems, localizing the consequences of the armed conflict.

These and other difficulties in combating illegal armed groups in the armed conflict zone necessitate making adjustments to the management system of law enforcement agencies in the Chechen Republic. Such a restructuring of operational and service activities can be carried out in the following areas.

First. It seems to us that the insufficient effectiveness of operational-search activities is largely due to the imperfection of interaction at the grassroots level of units of territorial security agencies, internal affairs agencies and security agencies in the troops located in the conflict zone. The conditions of an armed conflict require more effective management of all law enforcement agencies. It seems to us that their activities in the field of combating illegal armed groups should be implemented in real time on the basis of a single operational plan. First of all, this can be achieved at the level of the Regional Operational Headquarters. However, this is not enough. It is necessary to ensure systematic interaction of law enforcement agencies in the relevant areas of responsibility of troop groups and administrative-territorial centers of the Chechen Republic.

Second. Interaction and coordination can be improved by defining zones of operational responsibility of law enforcement agencies. Depending on the degree of tension of the operational situation, units of territorial agencies, as well as security agencies in the troops, can act as lead agencies. It is possible that in particularly important areas, where the territory is under the control of militants, the situation may require the creation of joint agencies — territorial security agencies and security agencies in the troops.

Third. In order to more fully utilize the capabilities of territorial security agencies and internal affairs agencies in ensuring the success of military operations to eliminate illegal armed groups, it is advisable to practice the creation of special operational (operational-investigative) groups operating as part of military groups. Such mobile operational groups are intended to conduct operational activities in the area of ​​basing of illegal armed groups, as well as directly in places of combat clashes with militants. It is quite obvious that this requires a normative and legal regulation of the position of the operational group as part of a military group: the tasks solved by the operational staff, the legal status of the head of the operational group, his powers and the procedure for interaction with the military commander — the head of the operation, the place of the group in the combat formation, the organization of communications and a system for supporting the group's activities in the field, etc.

Fourth. In our opinion, special attention should be paid to the creation of an effective system of search and verification work among contingents of persons suspected of involvement in gangs, and the operational search for leaders and active participants in illegal armed groups. For these purposes, it seems advisable to: develop and approve by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation an interdepartmental instruction «On the organization of search and verification work in the armed conflict zone»; strengthen the structural links of law enforcement agencies specializing in conducting operational searches in the conflict zone; intensify operational search work at checkpoints and in military commandant's offices, ensuring the regular receipt of operational information about militants moving along communications and in populated areas through official channels and with the help of operational sources; ensure comprehensive search and verification work with persons detained during special operations and service and combat actions of troops, reasonably suspected of involvement in illegal armed groups; to strengthen control over the issuance of new passports and other identity documents to citizens of the Chechen Republic in order to prevent the legalization of illegal armed group members.

The implementation of the above proposals will contribute to increasing the effectiveness of the fight against illegal armed groups in the armed conflict zone.

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