ACS and IP: no need to build barricades.
I may disappoint some readers, but there will be no revolutionary pathos in these notes, typical of many publications on the introduction of IP technologies into security systems. I don’t think there is any reason for such statements.
Because IP is just a low-level protocol for transmitting data over the Internet.
Naturally, the emergence and, most importantly, the mass implementation of IP technologies could not but encourage developers of access control and management systems (installation of network ACS began long before the world was entangled in the network web, and floppy disks were no longer used to transfer data between computers) to use local networks, and, if necessary, the Internet, in order to unite not only computers, but also the equipment of the systems themselves. Not all systems support this yet. Although the trend of increasing the amount of such equipment on the market is very noticeable. All developers are well aware that IP solutions will be increasingly in demand.
But every object is different. For example, the installer does not always have the physical ability to lay a cable. For example, the system must connect two buildings located on opposite sides of the main avenue of a large city. It is clear that the owner of the object will never receive permission for excavation work. Or the distance between the objects is so great that digging a trench of such length and laying a cable is very, very expensive. And it is not always possible to provide a radio channel. The only way left, in fact, to connect these two remote objects is to use the Internet. That is, to include equipment in the system that will work directly with the Internet, and information will be exchanged over the network. The same with local networks. Any installer, I am sure, can give many examples when, when equipping an object with an ACS, the use of existing computer networks was optimal from the point of view of the efficiency of the system and economic feasibility.
It is certain that the use of IP technologies is a very noticeable trend in the market of technical security equipment. It is obvious that this will continue to develop, and IP equipment will increasingly dominate. In fact, at the physical level, the TSB market is being integrated with the IT market. Indeed, more and more IT companies are forming departments specializing in security and are taking this topic very seriously. And this is no accident. Because if the same cable networks are used from the point of view of physical connection, why not combine IT solutions with security solutions in some integrated systems? To get, say, the following result: if the system does not record that an employee has entered the office, access to his computer will be blocked. Convenient, quite effective and attractive to the customer.
Are there any problems with the implementation of IP technologies? Of course, there are. There can't be none, and not only because this is a relatively new thing. Almost any technology, any data transfer mechanism used today has its pros and cons. Enough has already been said about the pros, however, I will not be afraid to once again focus the readers' attention on the main ones. These are convenience and savings on system installation, the ability to combine remote segments into a single system (for example, a chain of stores in an entire region) using the Internet.
Now about the problems. Firstly, as a rule, the access control and management system is connected to the public network. Naturally, if the channel has low bandwidth or is occupied by other information, this is especially typical for the Internet, delays in the transfer of ACS data may occur. It is clear that a dedicated communication line, when information is exchanged in real time, has an undeniable advantage here. The second and, probably, the main problem is the protection of data transmitted by the access control and management system. After all, the ACS as a security system must guarantee the protection of the transmitted information. Because the channel can be blocked. Or a false control action can be given and a door can be opened that should not be opened at the moment under any circumstances. Here, the issues of encryption and work on secure connections, for example, through VPN channels, become very relevant.
Unfortunately, not all manufacturers, both ours and foreign, can boast that in their ACS data exchange between devices or even between computers occurs in a protected format or protocol. But this is the current situation. It will definitely change for the better tomorrow. Almost all leading developers are concerned about solving this problem. So that data transmitted within the framework of security systems via a local network or the Internet are protected.
It is also worth mentioning the following. There is a category of facilities where connecting elements of security systems to common networks is simply unacceptable. I mean especially important facilities, such as defense enterprises, nuclear power plants, institutions whose work is related to state secrets, etc. At such facilities, permission to connect devices related to security to a common computer network is unlikely to be denied. Here, either dedicated networks are laid in parallel, or independent closed subnets are allocated using gateways. But most often, special communication lines are simply laid.
If we are talking about equipping, say, a business center with an access control and management system, which is designed to record working hours and restrict access to floors, then the issues of unauthorized removal of information via the network are not of key importance. Nobody needs it. Nobody needs to waste time and effort to hack the cleaner into the room she needs or to close the door of the neighbors from the upper floor.
As for providing online traffic for the ACS, a lot depends on how competently the network administration is built at the facility. As soon as the ACS is connected to the network, many issues immediately fall on the IT department. It is responsible for traffic distribution, channel load management and can limit traffic to ensure a free channel for transmitting information from the ACS and other security systems. These are issues of competent integration of IT solutions and security systems at the facility. From experience, I can say that, as a rule, it is possible to ensure stable operation of such a system, everything depends on how correct and competent the administrator's approach is.
If there is a risk that the information may be intercepted or that the communication channel will not be able to ensure the system operates online (and the customer needs this), it is necessary to look for options. Use the same radio channel. Or, if possible, lay a cable and use other networks for data exchange.
And each time it is necessary to look at how much possible failures in operation can affect the efficiency of the ACS as a whole and each of its subsystems. For example, data transmission delays will not affect the operation of the subsystem for recording working hours. At least in modern systems, in the controllers of which there are their own built-in clocks. The controller forms an event, recording the time of the actual presentation of the card to the reader, and sends information to the computer about the passage with the time of occurrence of this event. And even if this packet takes a long time to travel along the network, the report will still be real.
But, for example, there may be difficulties with the video verification function. A person puts a card to the reader, and his photo appears after 5 seconds, which is a lot. Are there such problems? Of course, there are. But I think that they will be solved, and quite soon. Because the development of networks is going by leaps and bounds. Rapid development. The capacity of communication channels is growing very quickly. This primarily applies to Moscow and other large cities. But in other regions, the development of networks is also very noticeable.
What is the demand for such solutions today? It is difficult to estimate this accurately. First of all, because systems are often combined. Within one ACS, there may be different technologies for connecting equipment to the system. Some segments are laid on RS-485, some — using computer networks. Nevertheless, in my opinion, at least a third of the systems installed today use IP devices. That is, it cannot yet be said that IP solutions prevail. There is no revolution. And, therefore, there is no need to build barricades and paste leaflets about IP achievements in cities and villages.
There is simply a gradual introduction of a fairly new technology for security systems and the displacement of good old RS-485 and the like. In some segments this happens faster. In others, slower.
The growth in the number of installations is obvious. I think that in the next 5-7 years the ratio in the ACS segment will be 80 to 20 in favor of IP solutions.
It is clear that I will not be upset if I suddenly make a mistake in my forecast.